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Conceptions of responsibility in bioethics – common fallacies and a way forward

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In this paper, I present an abridged version of my dissertation's introductory chapter. The general theme in the thesis is disciplinary research on bioethics and making sense of the political philosophy behind certain questions in bioethics. The topic grew out of an interest to analyse the premises and assumptions in a debated thread in bioethics arguing that in the near future, human flourishing will be increased with genetic technology. This notion raises questions about the nature, both from points of views of philosophy of science and political philosophy, of the accounts of responsibility for individual health and well-being and of the assumed construction of these.

My two research questions are: First, when looking at the mainstream literature of bioethics, what are the basic assumptions concerning the individual, and about the responsibility of that individual concerning her health and well-being? Secondly, independent of the first question, how should we approach the question of a proper notion of individual responsibility? How should we understand the division of responsibility between the individual and the society, state, or non-individual?

Presenting the historical and theoretical frameworks of my thesis, I discuss how bioethics was born in the 1960s from the need to oppose medical paternalism and to promote patient rights and autonomy in the rise of new medical technologies. The discipline quickly set its foot on principlism, with a strong emphasis on individual autonomy. However, the topics concerned in the discipline grew, during the decades, to larger societal questions, requiring a rich theory of political philosophy. The problem is that the most basic theoretical assumptions are still those from clinical ethics and medical ethics, assuming the individual as an autonomous decision-maker, able to control her life and balance decisions.

In the critical part of the thesis, I identify three current fallacies that emerge from this unfit combination of theory and application. First, in discussion of increasing health, it is the rational individual that is taken to be the primary target of intervention. This view, neglecting the social determinants of health, is problematic especially in discussion on chronic diseases. Secondly, in the discussion on how healthcare systems should be reformed, luck egalitarianism is considered to be a good theory to be introduced to health-care ethics in order to make the concept of personal responsibility stronger. Thirdly, in that same discussion, *solidarity* is taken to be a good remedy for problems of the modern society related to proceduralism, anonymous bureaucracy, and how these fade away individual responsibility. All of these fallacies produce a distorted notion of individual responsibility and promote a political moralism of responsibility.

In the constructive part, I give better answers to the issues criticized in the critical part. Firstly, I recommend a more social and holistic concept of an individual to mainstream bioethics. Secondly and thirdly, I analyze what the authors arguing for luck egalitarianism, and solidarity, actually argue for, and develop better answers to those calls.

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On Moral Obligatoriness of My Station and Its Duties in F.H. Bradley's "Ethical Studies"

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Abstract

In this paper I want to reconsider Bradley's idea of my station and its duties. Looking at this idea from the perspective of the moral philosophy, I am interested in the relationship between my station and its duties and moral obligation. My goal is to show that in Bradley's ethics the duties of one's station are neither necessary nor sufficient for the constitution of moral obligation. I will suggest that moral obligation is best explained as what is necessary for maintaining one's identity with the moral ideal. The duty that a person has due to her position in society is morally obligatory when the act that this duty requires also realizes the moral ideal.

Phenomenological Scepticism

Dennett's Challenge and A Husserlian Answer

The method of phenomenological reflection has faced criticism both within and outside the phenomenological tradition. The external critique is based on both naturalistic arguments (drawing from empirical studies and observed methodological restrictions) and philosophical concerns, especially epistemological and ontological varieties of scepticism. Naturalistic critique maintains that as a first-person description of experience phenomenological reflection fails to produce reliable, comparable, and repeatable results. According to strong scepticism, reflection fails to access anything real at all, whereas weaker forms of scepticism only deny the possibility of (scientific) knowledge about our conscious experience. Problems such as generalizing from our own experience, the lack of objective criteria, and troubles with verifying descriptions of both our past experience and others' experience are cited as reasons for questioning the value of phenomenological reflection.

Daniel Dennett is perhaps the most prominent proponent of the aforementioned combination of external criticism, which can be labeled as "phenomenological scepticism". In this paper, I will first distinguish between naturalistic and skeptical strands of argument in Dennett's case against phenomenological reflection. The goal is, then, to show that these lines of critique fall short in three respects. First, Dennett's critique is based on an unfounded equation between introspection and phenomenological reflection. Second, it is founded on insufficient understanding of the methodological steps of phenomenological reflection and their systematic, generalizing, and critical functions. Thirdly, in so far as Dennett points out real issues concerning the constraints and bias of everyday reflection, empirical introspection, and intuition, he fails to appreciate Husserlian efforts to alleviate them with methodological tools.

By returning to Husserl's writings, my aim is to reconstruct a more differentiated and faithful account of his method of phenomenological reflection. In this way, the goal is to articulate how "phenomenological scepticism" is at least partially misguided and how Husserlian phenomenological reflection might answer the justified worries raised by Dennett.

Abstract for "The 2017 Congress for Doctoral Students in Philosophy"

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Title: **The Barents Region and the Value of its Natural Environment**

The Barents Region, consisting of the northern part of Finland, Sweden and Norway and the north-west part of the Russian Federation, is characterized by sparse population, long distances, rough climate and the richness of natural resources such as forests, fish, minerals, oil and gas.

The focus of my paper will be on the natural environment of the Barents Region and its incalculable value from an environmental ethics point of view. We can read in the official website of the Barents Cooperation that the “Barents Region is one of few remaining areas with a relatively pristine natural environment: this implies a high quality of life, but it also entails a great responsibility. [...] Despite low population density, the areas are influenced by several heavy industrial activities.¹” Due to human activities, natural disasters and global warming the natural environment of the Barents Region and its unique but fragile ecosystem are at risk.

My argument will oppose the general contemporary trend of evaluating natural environments as they would be economic issues, using tools such as cost benefits analysis and the willingness to pay, which gives monetary value to nature. I will alternatively bring forth the idea that special environment, such as the Barents Region one, cannot be priced as that would confuse two different categories: nature and economics. That would imply a category mistake as the American philosopher Mark Sagoff argues in his book “The Economy of the Earth”. In my argumentation I refer to John O’Neill, expert in economics and to Marion Fourcade, sociologist, arguing that the application of economic tools to environmental issues is rather normative as it perpetrates a particular social structure and distribution of power where the lower income people, such as the indigenous, have less decision-making power than the higher income people.

Further I suggest that the natural environment of the Barents Region can rather be evaluated for its incommensurable value, considering the negative effects of its further degradation primarily for the indigenous and non-indigenous people who inhabit it, but also for the rest of the world population. In this attempt, I will privilege the aesthetic, the ethic and the ecological aspects connected to the special Barents ecosystem.

¹ Retried from the website <http://www.barentsinfo.org/Contents/Nature> on 15.07.2016.

“Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true...”: Descartes on the Occasional Sensory Errors and Skepticism of the Senses

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Abstract:

In the beginning of the skeptical argumentation of the *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descartes’s meditator states: “Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses or through the senses”. (AT VII, 18; CSM II, 12.) This *empirical principle*, though not upheld by Descartes himself, is the starting point of the Cartesian skepticism from which the famous scenarios of dreaming and deceiver follow.

However, although the later scenarios have garnered much attention in the secondary literature, Descartes’s approach to sensory based skepticism has in most readings been almost completely skipped. Part of the reason for this might be the anticipation to get to the more interesting argumentation. Another part of it might be the abrupt nature by which Descartes seems to treat the scenario, as he simply maintains that since the senses are occasionally in error one should never trust them completely. (AT VII, 18; CSM II, 12.) Despite this abruptness, I maintain that Descartes’s treatment of skepticism over sensory perception is crucial to his overall argument and for the achievement of the goals in the *Meditations*.

In the paper, I analyse the skeptical scenario of *Occasional Sensory Errors*, arguing for its naturalness and reasonable nature, while separating it from *systematic doubt* on the senses. I likewise contrast Descartes with the Aristotelian empiristic epistemology, identified as a model for the empirical principle in the beginning of the *Meditations*. I argue that Descartes held a somewhat Aristotelian view on empirical knowledge in his early writings (particularly in *Cogitationes Privatae* and *Compendium Musicae*), especially related to the *Resemblance Picture of Sensation* or *RPS* (that the reality resembles our sensory perceptions of it). Later, Descartes began criticizing these empirical views and it is this criticism that forms the basis of the occasional doubt on sensory errors.

Minimal self in enactivist framework: a unification of embodied and experiential aspects

One of the main challenges facing theories of the self is to explain the precise nature of basic selfhood. The notion of basic *minimal self* is widely debated and in the recent discussions there is a tension between (at least) two conceptions (e.g. Gallagher 2013). That is, minimal self can be understood either as *embodied identity* that makes a concrete spatial distinction between self and environment or as *experiential subjectivity*, i.e. subjective phenomenon that is first-personally experienced. However, it is unclear how these two conceptions are related, or whether they are alternative or rather complementary accounts of the basic selfhood. In this paper, we elaborate enactivist notion of minimal self: Up to the present, enactivist conception of self has been unspecified but our examination proposes that *enactivism* provides an account that manages to unify the embodied and experiential aspects of minimal self.

The conception of minimal self as embodied identity has been elaborated in enactivism. Generally, enactivism is a framework in cognitive science according to which cognition is sense-making activity that is based on the autonomous organization of living system (e.g. Thompson 2007). Self is understood as a cognitive system and we propose that more specifically as an autonomous agent. An autonomous agent comprises embodied identity and sense-making activity: it is a self-organizing and self-maintaining whole that is capable of regulating its interaction with environment according to its own norms (Barandiaran et al. 2009). However, the definition is mainly formal or operational and, at first sight, it seems to leave out experiential subjectivity of self.

Yet, many philosophical considerations have highlighted the experiential reading of minimal self. Here we refer especially to phenomenological tradition and Dan Zahavi's (2005; 2014) conception according to which minimal self is understood as a subject or subjectivity of experience. This implies that phenomenal consciousness and selfhood are constitutively connected: the experiential minimal self or pre-reflective self-consciousness can be identified with the first-personal character of experience.

We propose that a closer scrutiny indicates that the enactivist notion of embodied autonomous agent and Zahavi's account of experiential self can be seen as complementary conceptions of minimal self. Enactivism draws on phenomenology and its central idea is life-mind continuity that involves also experience. Further, self and cognition are essentially connected since maintenance of autonomous identity requires cognitive activity, and capacity for cognition requires autonomous identity. According to enactivism, cognition and consciousness belong together, and thus, it turns out to be warranted to claim that enactivist cognitive system is experiential as well. This kind of unification of enactivism and phenomenology seems to be mutually beneficial in the study of minimal self. Enactivism benefits from being connected to traditional philosophical theories of experience which aid in elaborating the enactivist conception of cognition and self, and phenomenological theories can be strengthened by more exhaustive description of the embodied basis of experience. The coupling of enactivist and phenomenological ideas clarifies the notion of minimal self by grounding the experiential subjectivity to embodied identity and thus provides a promising starting point for more extensive theories of self.

The sense in which intuitionistic logic is not
constructive
Gödel's early critique of intuitionism

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In a series of lectures in the 1930s and early 1940s, Gödel criticised intuitionism and especially Heyting's interpretation of intuitionistic logic. His negative remarks can be divided into two broad categories. His most often repeated arguments are against the proof interpretation of intuitionistic connectives, especially in the case of implication, the definition of which is, according to him, impredicative. He also believed that intuitionistic logic implicitly allows for non-constructive existence proofs in the form of universal statements. In my paper, I will discuss both lines of criticism as they apply to pure logic, focusing especially on the second aspect, which has not so far been studied in depth.

The first problem dissolves if one uses a proof system for intuitionistic logic that normalises, an option which was unknown to Gödel at the time. Furthermore, as e.g. Tait has argued, the Curry-Howard correspondence between type theory and natural deduction shows that the notion of proof is no more problematic than Gödel's own alternative system using functionals of finite types (the so-called *Dialectica* interpretation). The second problem seems to originate from the idea of the 1932 Gödel-Gentzen translation between classical and intuitionistic arithmetic, which Gödel thinks shows that intuitionistic logic is simply a "renaming" of classical logic. Still around 1940, Gödel was fascinated with the different aspects of the connection between classical and intuitionistic logic; and it is on these grounds that he misunderstands the hypothetical nature of intuitionist negation and assumes that it, too, implicitly contains a non-constructive element.

MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ENDEAVOR – THE CASE OF SHARED TASK REPRESENTATIONS

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Joint action has been the topic of intensive study in the behavioral and cognitive sciences during recent years. Researchers in developmental psychology and evolutionary anthropology have sought to understand the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of our capacity for joint action, and the disposition to act together has even been recruited as a key explanatory variable for the emergence of natural language and cumulative cultural evolution. Researchers in cognitive psychology and neuroscience have on the other hand been concerned with disentangling the cognitive mechanisms underlying our phylogenetically distinctive capacity for joint action in order to determine whether joint action is produced by dedicated cognitive mechanisms, or whether joint action is the outcome of general-purpose mechanisms for action coordination and control. Much of this research has converged today on whether individuals are disposed to *co-represent* the tasks of their partners in joint action, thereby forming *shared task representations* of their common task, and whether this hypothesis best accounts for much discussed interference effects in new experimental paradigms, such as the *Joint Simon Task*. I will survey this on-going experimental and theoretical research in cognitive science from the point of view of mechanistic philosophy of science so as to answer the following two questions: 1) Could shared task representations function as a mechanism for minimal forms of joint action? 2) Could minimal forms of joint action function as a mechanism for the more advanced forms of joint action that are studied by the behavioral scientists?

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Trans* kinship, children's rights, and the school

Quite recently, the schools in 'Western', liberal societies have started paying more attention to the recognition and accommodation of trans*ⁱ children. Changes in school practices, such as providing non-gendered bathrooms, are long-awaited and mostly welcomed, but what is the target of *recognition* of trans* children? Minority children's right to social or cultural recognition at schools has usually been defined according parents' social group or background culture (for instance language and religion), but what kind of conceptual problems arise in recognizing a minority which lacks intergenerational 'cultural' continuum? Parents' background culture clearly cannot be the defining feature of the recognition of trans* children, because they do not usually share the same history or 'culture' as their parents. I will argue that trans* children do not fit easily within current constructions of children's agency- or cultural rights, but it does not follow that these notions should be abandoned altogether. Rather, a deconstructed and more individualized notion of children's social and cultural bonds, together with a stronger concept of children's own agency, would translate into more coherent concept of children's cultural rights. At the same time, it is crucial to be aware of the regulating, normalizing and standardizing powers of the language of rights within educational contexts.

ⁱ "Trans* is an umbrella term that refers to all of the identities within the gender identity spectrum", (a definition from: <http://itspronouncedmetrosexual.com/2012/05/what-does-the-asterisk-in-trans-stand-for/#sthash.m2UpzMjK.dpuf>) Historically, "trans" have been seen as oppositional to "queer", but Jack Halberstam conceptualizes trans* "through queer lenses", highlighting the transformative and shifting process, rather than stability, of trans* identity. (Halberstam, Jack: "Trans* kinship", lecture 30th May, 2017).

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Social Self-Control and the Case of ADHD

This paper presents an argument for accounting for self-control as a socially constructed capacity. Self-control is often seen as that which allows us to inhibit acting in accordance with an impulsive desire in order to reach a long-term goal – the “moral muscle”. The phrase was popularized by Roy Baumeister, but it is a prime example of the wide cultural and philosophical understanding of self-control as essential for autonomous moral agency. While there is plenty of evidence to suggest that there is a significant environmental and social component to self-control, in both neuroscience and philosophy, self-control remains largely discussed as primarily a trait with a locus in the brain.

The concept of self-control has raised plenty of neuroscientific, psychological and philosophical interest in the last decade or two. Neuroscientific findings have identified the the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, particularly the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in the right hemisphere, as playing a key role in self-control. This focus on neurobiology is also reflected in the philosophical literature, with most philosophical discussion of self-control also locating it firmly in the brain.

Findings suggest that the functioning of the IFG is deficit in a number of psychopathological conditions, such as depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD), as well as in addictive behavior. This implies that we might be able to study the significance of the IFG and other neurobiological constructs to self-control by looking at self-control in individuals with one of these conditions. Addicts have been used as case studies in the study of self-control before. However, there are a number of reasons to study self-control by reference to a condition such as ADHD rather than addictions: first, ADHD is a markedly more stable condition. Secondly, given its strong heritability, ADHD is markedly less dependent on socioeconomical and other environmental factors.

The heritability of ADHD opens up an avenue for the study of self-control within the paradigm of behavioural genetics. *Contra* genetic determinism, understanding ADHD as a phenomenon with a predominantly genetic etiology allows for a way to examine it, and its resultant deficit self-control, as phenomena that, while hereditary and inherently biological phenomena by etiology, remain environmental in character. The lived experiences of people with ADHD point towards that their ability to exert self-control is largely dependent on social and environmental scaffolding. For example, older adolescents with ADHD often face disproportionate difficulty as they go to college, losing the daily family support they have depended on. Similarly, consider the fact that some people with ADHD are high achievers despite the disorder, experiencing the disorder as causing little if any difficulty. In this paper, I demonstrate that accounting for self-control as socially constructed access to certain behaviors does not preclude accounting for it on genetic or neurobiological terms, but rather, analysing self-control on terms of behavioural genetics supports understanding it as socially constructed.

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Work as a social good – what should work provide for us?

In my presentation, I discuss the question of what kind of social good work should be. I argue that if we take seriously the demand of meaningful work, and emphasize the role work has in the distribution of political and economic power, we can (or should?) set higher demands to work life than we are accustomed even in affluent western countries.

In our societies, we have set minimum criteria to decent work, that is, to work that can be reasonably accepted as a way to earn one's living. Even The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets conditions for everyone's right to work. However, these minimum demands are insufficient for guaranteeing a work life that would satisfy the demands of meaningfulness and just distribution of economic goods.

I look at two strains of arguments concerning work as a social good: 1) What are the demands of meaningfulness that work should satisfy, and 2) if we take work to be a social good, how is it connected to distribution of political and economic goods, which also are a part of just distribution? In other words, what is the role of work in distributive justice, especially in the distribution of income, property, and power in society?

These issues are connected with discussions such as the roles of markets and politics in the society, emphasizing predistribution over redistribution, and the problematic role of work in political philosophy.

‘Nature’ and ‘Wilderness’ in Ecological Restoration

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Climate change, population growth and growing consumption have led to the destruction of our natural environments, loss of biodiversity and started the sixth mass extinction. Ecological restoration promises an answer to environmental degradation by restoring damaged ecosystems to their former condition. Due to the damaged state of our environment, restoration serves as a major form of environmental management in the future. However, the terms ‘nature’ and ‘wilderness’ are potentially blocking the ethical justification of restoration projects. This paper presents a conceptual analysis of ‘nature’ and ‘wilderness’ within the context of ecological restoration. The aim is to analyse and identify the ambiguities surrounding the concepts that commonly arise in environmental philosophy discussions, and to redefine ‘nature’ in a way that avoids these ambiguities.

Ecological restoration has received a great deal of criticism, especially among environmental philosophers. According to the sceptics, ecological restoration leads to ‘artificial’ or ‘fake’ nature. It has been argued that it is far from obvious that restoration activities are able to restore all the values of a damaged ecosystem, especially that of naturalness. Another major concern is how restoration could be, and is being used, as a tool for business. Companies (could) justify environmentally destructive activities by promising that the damage is only temporary, since the area will be restored to its former condition. This paper argues that these problems arise from misunderstanding the meaning of the terms ‘nature’ and ‘wilderness’.

The paper places ‘nature’ and ‘wilderness’ under the microscope and analyses how these two concepts distort and produce inconsistencies within the restoration debate. Both of these concepts have enjoyed the attention of philosophers but have not been sufficiently analysed together. Restoration provides the ideal framework in which to explore ‘nature’ and ‘wilderness’ as it highlights the distinction between the natural and the artificial, humans and nature, and different kinds of values found in nature. Philosophical analysis of restoration therefore shines a light on the fascinating complexities of ‘nature’ and our relationship with it that might otherwise go unnoticed.

The paper goes on to explore how ‘wilderness’ can be a useful concept that can be used to settle fundamental problems with our understanding of natural, wild and restored nature. ‘Wilderness’ can therefore be used to carry some of the semantic burden that ‘nature’ has come to bear and, until now, its utility has mostly gone unnoticed. Based on this, the paper aims to construct a single definition of ‘nature’ that permits ecological restoration whilst simultaneously giving strong justification for nature conservation.

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ABSTRACT: The epistemic dimension of political exclusion

My paper is based on a chapter from my dissertation manuscript that explores different facets of the injustice of political exclusion. To this end, I invoke Miranda Fricker's much-discussed concept of "epistemic injustice" as a starting point for an exploration of "epistemic exclusion" as one important way that already otherwise disadvantaged groups are excluded from public discourse.

In Fricker's account, epistemic injustice is committed against some groups and individuals specifically as *knowers*, and in its systemic, structural form leads to the diminishing or dismissal of the testimony of disadvantaged groups, silencing of their voices from public discourse. The wrong of epistemic injustice consists of the extremely negative effects that prejudicial exclusion from trustful conversation has on the excluded, preventing them from developing a healthy social identity in interaction with other members of society through "denying access to what originally furnishes status as a knower" (Fricker 2007, 145). This denial of testimonial legitimacy works to undermine the confidence in one's very own social experience, and is often connected to the "hermeneutical" injustice of the symbolic space of the community lacking the concepts to put some wrongs into words.

While Fricker outlines many important sides of the problem, her explicit focus is on epistemological virtue ethics, not political critique, and remains mostly quiet on the relationships of domination and exclusion that undergird cases of epistemic injustice. Her work nevertheless illuminates how groups and individuals become incapable of giving credible testimony about social injustices they suffer. In extreme cases this leads to a situation Nikolas Kompridis (2008, 301) calls *aphonia*, the incapacity to politically articulate one's suffering.

Fricker's work is a good starting point for an exploration of a more critical concept of epistemic exclusion that goes beyond the confines of her account of epistemic injustice. To sketch the critical outlines of such a concept, I contrast Fricker's work against Gayatri Spivak's (1988) account of "epistemic violence" committed against subaltern groups, such as non-western speakers, by denying them a status as legitimate knowers. Then, to draw the conversation towards a more conventionally political ground, I connect both to Pierre Bourdieu's (1991) notion of "symbolic violence", the way excluded groups often are made complicit in their own political domination and exclusion, leading to the continued reproduction of exclusion from politics. Epistemic exclusion, as outlined in my paper, forms an important dimension of such political exclusion.

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Reliabilism and possibility-based epistemology of modality: some problems

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In recent years, there has been attempts to account for modal knowledge by starting with accounting for knowledge of possibility¹. I will challenge this prevalent way of approaching epistemology of modality by considering how it fits to reliabilist epistemology. More specifically, I will consider Sonia Roca-Royes' (2017) modal epistemology of concrete objects, and her reasons to favor possibility-based modal epistemology concerning them. Her main claim is that we can "satisfactorily explain" our knowledge concerning possibilities of concrete objects without appealing to prior essentialist knowledge, and she suggest that we come to know possibilities of concrete objects by comparing them to relevantly similar objects.

The main problem I will address is that possibility-based epistemology of modality and reliabilist do not seem to work well together. Let's assume that there are lot of modal truths concerning the possibilities of an object *o* and that these truths are mind-independent. Let's also assume that there are necessary or essential truths concerning the object, which means that there are also such possibility propositions concerning the object *o* which are not true. Now, reliabilist wants to say that there is a reliable process to form possibility beliefs in such a way that our beliefs are likely to be true – in Roca-Royes' theory the process is comparison of relevant similarity. I will claim that any reliabilist epistemology that aims to explain knowledge of possibility, falls short on being reliabilist after all. I will claim that no process of belief forming in modal thinking can be reliable unless we have good reasons to believe that it enables us to discriminate between true and false modal beliefs. Possibility-based accounts, however, will not offer us such reasons.

¹ Sonia Roca-Royes (2017), Barbara Vetter (2016).

”LA MATIÈRE METTE EN NOUS L’OUBLI”

The Effort of Remembrance as the Metaphysical Effort in Henri Bergson’s Philosophy”

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This paper analyzes Henri Bergson’s concept of memory as a condition of metaphysical action. Philosophically considered, Bergson’s idea of remembrance or the actualization of memory is about rearranging and intensifying the capabilities of human experience. I will elaborate the idea of remembrance with its two component concepts, namely *habit* and *effort*.

For Bergson, every human action is a habit of memory. Ordinary human action is focused on and accustomed to the exigences of life, it is driven by pragmatic and vital reasons. But philosophical thought could develop a different kind of acting or thinking that is not subordinated to any sort of exigencies. The philosophical effort intensively *remembers the reality*. To remember the reality in itself is to intensively sympathize with it, to undergo it spiritually – this is what Bergson famously calls as intuition. In another terms, the task of metaphysics is to turn the attention from concepts and objects to the sympathy of the things in themselves, to turn the attention to the enduring nature of reality.

Bergson’s concepts of habit and effort offer a crucial basis to understand remembrance as a metaphysical action. The sympathy needs both to operate. It is possible only on the basis of habits which actualizes memory, and by an intellectual or spiritual effort which gives birth to the ever intensifying habits. The habits give the ground for the effort while the effort compresses novel habits. Memories are the matter of habits and the milieu of effort. The task of metaphysics is thus transformed into an active effort, an action of its own kind.

Addressing Structural Injustice in Schooling: Parental Responsibilities for Political Collective Action

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Abstract

In this paper, I analyse moral and political responsibilities that parents may have when their children are educated in a structurally unjust school system. I argue that at least the following two factors can justify parents' political responsibilities to address structural injustice in education: (1) parents' choices about their children's education and (2) unfair benefitting that results from structural injustice. The paper argues that these factors can justify an obligation to participate in political action organized through collective agents: acting alone, parents cannot effectively influence the social structures. Yet changing the unjust structures is the most effective way of compensating the unfair benefitting.

Highly segregated school systems with diversified educational provision often cause worse educational opportunities to children with disadvantaged family backgrounds. For instance, better-off parents can use housing market or private education for securing a good schooling to their children, whereas worse-off parents cannot afford such strategies. While such a social structure is clearly unfair from the perspective of equal opportunity, it is difficult to put the blame on any parties in a straightforward way: unjust social structures related to education are often a product of unintended macro-level societal processes such as residential segregation and school segregation. Therefore, it is also unclear who are obliged to contribute to the effort of changing the unjust structures and how significant contributions moral or political responsibility requires.

I connect parental political responsibilities to parents' educational choices by examining moral dilemmas that better-off families face due to the structural injustices of society and school system. For instance, while parents have an obligation to promote justice in society, they are also obliged to secure a sufficiently good education for their children. These obligations are in conflict given that sufficiently good education in practice produces an unfair competitive advantage to the child. In a segregated school system, securing a good education may require a school choice that also confers unfair competitive advantages. In circumstances of such structural injustice, moral balancing often favours acting in accordance with parental obligations: all things considered, parents are often justified in making educational choices that produce unfair benefits to their children. Choosing unselfishly would neither abolish the unjust structures nor produce significant benefits to the worse-off children.

However, if the dilemma involves genuine conflicting obligations, then the choice of either horn of the dilemma results in a moral residual. For instance, while a competitive school choice may be justified on balance, the unfair benefitting arising from the choice may justify a further obligation to compensatory action. I argue that the moral residual can justify a political obligation to participate in action of collective agents that have power to bring about structural changes. More specifically, parents have two kinds of political obligations: First, they are obliged to refrain from political action that perpetuates structural injustice. Second, they are obliged to participate in political action that aims at changing the unjust structures.

Abstract: *Êthos* like an octopus – character, appearance and deceit in Plato’s Sophist and ancient tragedy

In ancient Greek tragedy, poetry and, also, philosophy people are (morally) judged for their character, *êthos*. A person can be said to be virtuous, noble or base, usually based on how they appear to others. As a result, one can gain a good or a bad repute – an appearance or an image perceived by others. The characters of ancient tragedies, and often also the participants of Plato’s dialogues, are very aware of how they present themselves to others and how they and their actions are perceived. Winning fame and avoiding disgrace are of great significance in leading a good or worthwhile life, but fame and disgrace can also bring about concrete social consequences.

This, however, results in a problem, which will be the focus of this paper. An *êthos* is a slippery thing. It is not clear exactly *how* a character is perceived. Is it something that can be seen, felt or witnessed? And, consequently, is it something that could be known, trusted or judged correctly? Based on the ancient sources, we can preliminarily conclude that an *êthos* can be either clearly expressed in a spectacular or ‘fitting’ act (for example, of extraordinary bravery or an act that is ‘in line’ with one’s character) or, on the contrary, disguised with lying, make-up or deceit and so forth. And, to make things even more complex, sometimes it seems that *êthos* can only be grasped in a fleeting glimpse.

In line with these confusing aspects of an *êthos*, fifth century Greek poet, Theognis, suggests that it would be convenient for his young student to cultivate an *êthos* that resembles a color-changing octopus: to be of certain character in one situation and “of different hue” in another (Theognis, 213-218 in *Elegy and Iambus, Volume I*, 1931). The problem here is that, face to face with a possibly ever-changing *êthos*, neither we nor the ancients could know who is what she really is or claims to be and who is merely ‘changing color’. Thus, it is difficult to know a person’s ‘true’ character – distinguished from a hue, a mere appearance or a false repute – and to form rightful judgements based on an *êthos*. This, of course, is a variation of the familiar theme of disparity between true being and mere appearance, a theme already common in ancient philosophy and tragedy.

In my paper, I will examine the problem of being and appearance in relation to persons, characters and repute as described by ancient authors. To get hold of the question I have chosen to study two characters of many colors that are especially difficult to seize: First, the character of the sophist in Plato’s dialogue, *The Sophist*, and second, the character of Odysseus, the well-known prototype of a trickster, in Sophocles’ and Euripides’ *Philoctetes* plays. I argue that an examination of these figures helps us to comprehend the difficulties of perceiving, knowing, and judging a person.

Is Kant's Transcendental Philosophy a Form of Ontology?

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It is often attributed to Kant that he wanted to destroy or indeed did destroy metaphysics, at least in the traditional sense. Of this traditional metaphysics, perhaps the most significant part is ontology. There of course are various ways of describing or defining ontology but probably all would agree that it is an attempt at a doctrine concerning things/objects/reality and the way they are/exist. That is, ontology tries to say what there is, or what the world is like.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant explicitly states that his transcendental philosophy is not ontology, and doesn't really include ontology. This still doesn't mean that his philosophy is not trying to accomplish any of the things that ontology tried to accomplish. Rather, it seems that Kant is criticizing the traditional or scholastic way of doing ontology. In this respect he writes that

the understanding can never accomplish *a priori* anything more than to anticipate the form of a possible experience in general, and since that which is not appearance cannot be an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility within which alone objects are given to us. Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of appearances, and the proud name of an ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic *a priori* cognitions of things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g., the principle of casuality), must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding. (A 246-247 / B 303.)

Now, it is definitely something to notice that Kant indeed takes all of the doctrines that i.e. for Baumgarten make up metaphysics (ontology, cosmology, rational psychology, and rational theology) and simply removes or replaces them with something that fits the critical system. In this case that what Kant calls an "analytic of the pure understanding" rather straightforwardly replaces ontology. But as we shall see, Kant was not willing to give up the concept of ontology altogether. On his lectures on metaphysics, Kant shows us another view on the matter:

There [in ontology] I speak already of things, substances and accidents, which are properties of things that I cognize *a priori*. But I cannot speak this way in the *Critique*. Here I will say substance and accident are also found among the concepts that are *a priori*. How do I arrive at that? What can I accomplish with that? What is possibly cognized *a priori* of objects, insofar as they are substances? (Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 1997: 114ff.)

In the paper I try to show the sense in which Kant wants to deny the possibility of ontology, and the sense in which he still is doing it himself. A key point is to show that even if Kant didn't want to do it within the critical system, his transcendental philosophy can still be taken to be at least a ground of an ontology in the sense that with the transcendental system we arrive at certain *a priori* conditions of existence of appearances, which "give us" certain necessary properties of these objects, appearances.

Varieties of Rigidity

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ABSTRACT

The characterization of rigidity given by Kripke (1980, 48) states that an expression is a *rigid designator* if it designates the same object in every possible world in which the object exists. The further explications and interpretations of this notion have been widely studied and analyzed especially in the context of theories of direct reference (see e.g. Soames 2002, Martí 2003, Salmon 2005). In this paper I focus on less known variants of rigidity that are largely independent of the questions of direct reference, namely those relevant for Jaakko Hintikka's work in modal semantics. Hintikka's struggles with the notion of rigidity were exceptional (at least) in the following four respects.

First, Hintikka (1957b; 1962; 1963) was among the first to introduce a notion similar to rigidity and among the first to consider it as fundamental in modal semantics. Yet Hintikka kept re-evaluating the plausibility of the notion until presenting his final critical assessment in his 2007 book. Hence it took more than four decades for Hintikka to come in terms with the notion.

Second, Hintikka's writings on rigidity are remarkably ambivalent. There is a tension between Hintikka's strict rejection of formulations such as the one given above and his acceptance of something quite similar under a different name.

Third, Hintikka struggled with the questions of rigidity in the contexts of three radically different semantic theories: with his model sets, his world-line approach, and finally with his game-theoretical semantics. These provided three different frameworks for implementing rigidity, or alternatively, for questioning its rationale.

Fourth, Hintikka's strictest criticism were directed towards precisely the above kind of characterization of rigidity. The issue at stake was *not* whether proper names, indexicals, certain descriptions, or some other expressions of natural language are rigid. Hintikka's most skeptical claim was more general, namely that rigidity has no place, or is dispensable, in formal semantics of any applied modal language.

In order to comprehend Hintikka's rigidity-skepticism and the involved discrepancies I assume, as a working hypothesis, that it makes sense to distinguish between three different varieties of rigidity. I call these *formal rigidity*, *semantical rigidity*, and *linguistic rigidity*. In addition to introducing these variants of rigidity I trace Hintikka's thoughts on rigidity roughly from the 60's to this millennium, that is, from *Knowledge and Belief* (1962) to *Socratic Epistemology* (2007). I argue that the crucial notion for Hintikka was *semantical rigidity* but that he couldn't, after all, articulate a coherent critical position towards it. Hence I disagree with Hintikka (1962), Hintikka & Sandu (1995), Tulenheimo (2009), and Pietarinen (2010) who claim that rigidity may be "defined", "accounted for", or "analysed" in Hintikka's framework without positing actual rigid designators. I argue that if one operates with a framework that is sufficiently strong for defining rigidity then the crucial moves have already been made: it has been assumed that the *objects* that one's language is about are such that it makes sense to consider them as being the same from world to world and, second, it has been assumed that one's semantics contains *means* to track those objects from

one world to another. To assume these is to assume rigidity in one specific sense. One may employ this specific rigidity to describe other perhaps more general forms of rigidity but such profound criticism that Hintikka seemed to have in mind towards rigidity becomes untenable after accepting the above assumptions.

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Essence, kinds, and the ground of de re modality

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According to the essentialist theory of metaphysical modality, p is metaphysically necessary iff there is something the nature or essence of which requires that p , and p is metaphysically possible iff there is nothing the nature or essence of which requires that not- p . Unfortunately, this theory would appear to be in tension with a combination of some other attractive views: (1) that metaphysical modality is absolute -- i.e. that facts about what is metaphysically possible or necessary could not have been otherwise; (2) that (some things need not have existed and) if a thing does not exist, there is no fact of the matter about its nature or essence, about what it is. One apparently promising way to respond to this problem involves pointing out that what is essential to a thing is plausibly determined (perhaps completely) by its general kind -- e.g. the set {Socrates, Plato} essentially has the members it does and no others because this is (part of) what it is in general to be a set -- and that general kinds are plausibly necessary existents -- or at any rate good candidates for necessary existents in comparison with individual essences. I will show that this line of response is problematic.

Adorno on Progress in (Electronic) Music

Even more than other concepts, Adorno claims, the concept of progress is in need of careful examination. Yet, the exact definition is hard to give and it might even do harm to the concept. This is because exact definition freezes one possible meaning and suppresses others. “[P]aralysing facts and specialized meanings” prevent us from comprehensive understanding. For Adorno, the meaning of progress can be formulated in a simply way: it is “the prevention and avoidance of total catastrophe”. We cannot find the concrete signs of progress from reality and for this reason we cannot precisely say what progress is. The concept can be defined only according to its negation: the oncoming catastrophe.

To think that there has been progress in history leads to the “idolization of history” and this kind of ideological block prevents progress in future. To believe that humankind is uninterruptedly progressing towards freedom is to affirm the wrong society. It leads astray to assume that humanity exists and therefore that it could progress. Rather, “the very establishment of humanity in the first place” would represent progress. To progress is to be released from the “magic spell” that progress is itself a real and natural thing. When we dominate nature, what actually happens is that our inner nature dominates us: we are controlled by our control of nature. Therefore, when we stop using techno-scientific progress for ruling and controlling nature, we might be able to progress as human beings. This leads Adorno to say: “progress occurs where it comes to an end”.

From the writings of Adorno, one can distinguish two concepts of progress. Firstly, there is progress in domination of nature. That means increasing control over material with technological and scientific developments. Secondly, progress occurs only if humankind as a whole progresses, not just some particular spheres of it like science and technology. Progress in humanity is connected to the progress of spirit towards freedom and progress in the self-reflection of subjects. These two concepts of progress are in a dialectical relationship and they cannot happen without each other.

Adorno mentions that “particular advances in the techniques of domination contain the potential for the very opposite of the progress”. As we know, modern technology can cause massive damages but nevertheless, we need this kind of progress and the formal rationality it has caused. For Adorno, the “element of formal equality” is extremely important for the freedom of individuals. Humankind has certainly witnessed the progress from “the slingshot to the megaton bomb” but Adorno thinks that with techno-scientific developments we can reach situation where “violence might vanish altogether”. With progress in domination, progress towards redemption and happiness becomes conceivable.

Both sides of progress are aiming towards freedom, but according to Adorno, techno-scientific progress hinders this process. Due the rationalized structure of society people are reduced to “the status of functions” and to be free means merely the possibility to sustain one’s life. True freedom would mean the ability to think that things might be different. In the dialectical movement of enlightenment, rationality has liberated itself from myth by the domination of nature but through this process, it has lost its ability in critical self-reflection. Domination of nature has turned to self-domination and rationality has become a part of unreflective nature. Rationality as progress in domination of nature has betrayed its promise of progress towards freedom. To reach freedom in this situation, we do need rationality of enlightenment but this rationality needs to be transcended.

“All progress in the cultural spheres is that of the domination of material, of technique”, Adorno says and continues in the same breath: “[p]rogress in the mastery in art is in no way immediately identical with the progress of art itself.” Hence, within art, too, there are two notions of progress: advancement in techniques and progress in art itself. The latter means development in the quality of art and in the truth content of it. “[A]dvances in the material have hardly benefitted the quality of the works that use them”, Adorno continues. Nevertheless, the development in truth content and quality of art happens through the progress in technique.

Progress takes its place at the level of musical material. The most advanced stage of technique and technology prescribes a task for composers. Progressive artworks are responses to the historical demands of material. Musical material is in a dialectical movement that is consisted of the interaction between historical subject and objective musical material. This movement can be understood as progress.

It is justified to ask why music should progress at all. For Adorno music is reflecting society at the level of its form, and in so doing, it is also criticizing society. Music must keep itself at the level of the present-day technique and expressive means because otherwise its ability to criticize fades. In addition, music must progress in the level of domination of nature so that it could progress in the level of quality and truth content. If music does not progress, it starts to affirm society and that is harmful for societal progress.

In the final part of my essay, I will concentrate on the progress from twelve-tone technique via serialism to electronic music. The twelve-tone technique guarantees that the traditional laws of harmony and the idea of tonal centre are negated. It questions handed-down material and aims at the elimination of all “irrational” elements of tradition. Therefore, it is a good example of the dialectical movement of musical material.

For Adorno, the twelve-tone technique is a medium for compositional freedom. The rules are not arbitrary or simply mathematical but rather expressions of the demands of contemporary musical material. However, in the strict rules Adorno sees a tendency towards regression. The extreme rationalization pushes the twelve-tone technique back to myth; it becomes just a “number game”. With serialism, the twelve-tone technique reached even more rigorous and controlled form. Serialists thought that the twelve-tone technique was not ordering musical material completely and they wanted to extend it to concern all musical parameters.

Adorno considers serialism as the total outcome of the progressive rationalization of music but it is also an over-rationalized dead-end. Adorno thinks that if the whole act of composing is just to write down what series automatically produce “one could compose better with an electronic computer”. He did not believe that serialism could develop further and solve problems caused by rationality. Nevertheless, this “objective-calculatory ordering” went even further with electronic music.

For deeper analysis and generation of sounds, serialists turned into technology and found new electronic media. The ideology of serialism was followed most clearly in Cologne studio. Composers there thought that electronic music is a logical consequence of serial technique but they wanted, in turn, to extend its control. Control of the timbre was the main goal. It was thought that with the combination of perfect sound material (pure sine waves) and perfect theory (total serialism) this could be reached.

Today’s electronic music is unquestionably using new materials, techniques, and technologies. But is it creating something new at the level of form and content? Is there progress happening in the quality and truth content of?

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