Connections between epistemic beliefs, internet reliance and ICT practices
As is often the case, my dissertation journey started in 2010 from an everyday observation that I could not explain to myself. I reflected upon my first-year students turning to Google at almost any information need. Looking it up on the net was becoming a self-evident practice, embodied, for instance, in the acronym JFGI. I asked myself: “Could it be possible that these students – born in the late 1980s to early 1990s – view knowledge in another way compared to previous generations?”. “Googling approach” was the working name I used for the phenomenon I had observed, assuming that it was an expression for an underlying internet reliance.
The research process came to focus on three units of analysis, namely 1) ICT practices, 2) epistemic beliefs, and 3) internet reliance. For the first two, conceptual frameworks and inventories were available, whereas internet reliance needed to be operationalised.
Exploring ICT practices and skills was uncomplicated thanks to existing instruments and an ICT Driving Licence that included performance-based level tests.
The concept of epistemic beliefs basically builds upon epistemology albeit on an individual level. To enable measuring, an individual’s epistemic beliefs have been regarded as a set of dimensions, structured in two general areas, namely 1) the nature of knowledge containing a) structure and b) certainty of knowledge, and 2) the nature of knowing, containing c) omniscient authority or source of knowledge (both labels have been used) and d) justification for knowing. Within this line of investigation, several conceptual frameworks and inventories for measuring epistemic beliefs had been introduced.
My exploration of the concepts of googling approach and internet reliance around 2010 coincided with a lively debate about so-called digital natives. Some researchers – and also the public debate – suggested that more or less all young people are digital natives, that they use ICT frequently and in a versatile way, and that they master ICT tools proficiently. Some authors suggested that they learn differently and even that their brains develop differently due to frequent use of ICT. These descriptions of the alleged characteristics of the so-called digital natives and their alleged ICT and information practices served the operationalisation of the concept of internet reliance.
The three studies forming the thesis build on one single set of data collected in 2011 and 2012 among two cohorts of first-year students. The first two studies provided the concepts and indicators for ICT practices, epistemic beliefs, and internet reliance, enabling the third study, where possible associations between these traits were explored. The third study revealed a positive correlation between internet reliance and three dimensions of epistemic beliefs. The results suggest that a higher level of internet reliance may go hand in hand with so-called naïve epistemic beliefs, that is, views that regard knowledge as certain, absolute, and unchanging (certainty of knowledge), consisting of unambiguous, isolated bits (structure of knowledge), and basically being handed down by an omniscient authority (as the source of knowledge).
Testimony, justification for knowing, and epistemic justice
The association between internet reliance and authority as the source of knowledge constitutes the main finding of the thesis, and it also raises new questions. We know that the personalisation algorithms of search engines are continuously developing, now also spiced-up with artificial intelligence (AI). Thereby, an increasing part of the information we receive is stemming from algorithms and consequently, the association between internet reliance and omniscient authority (as source of knowledge) raises questions regarding trust in non-human, so-called algorithmic authorities (Lustig & Nardi, 2015).
To explore trust in algorithmic authorities and its potential pitfalls, a possible avenue could include exploring what happens when we receive (external) information and internalise it to be part of our (internal) knowledge. This exploration should involve sources of information, how we justify our knowing, and epistemic justice, that is, what level of credibility are we affording the source of information. These are the topics I choose to discuss briefly below.
Testimony – the main source of information
Testimony is generally considered to be the most important route to knowledge besides perception, inference/reason, introspection, and memory (see, e.g., Simon, 2010; Steup & Neta, 2020). Here, I am applying the more liberal definition of testimony as “tellings in general”, as suggested by Tollefsen (2009). Further, since most of our online interactions are about conveying information, they are testimonial in nature (Origgi & Ciranna, 2017, p. 310).
Currently, much energy is wasted on arguing around print or online media. Instead, I think we need to pay more attention to the information source, that is, who is saying something. Since an increasing part of the information we receive is stemming from the web, the intriguing question reads: whose testimony are we hearing or reading? Is the testimony stemming from another human, from some hidden algorithm or even from bots or trolls? Last but not least, can web users, or do they even have a chance to, identify the source?
Secondly, we should explore how users justify statements or testimonies depending on the information source, which brings us to the dimension of justification for knowing.
Justification for knowing
The dimension of justification for knowing has been suggested to consist of three subdimensions or strategies. When we receive information, we may use one of these strategies – or a combination of them – to overcome epistemic doubt:
- justification by authority,
- justification by personal reasoning, and
- justification by multiple sources.
This three-dimensional construct has been validated by Bråten et al. (2019) in the Internet-Specific Epistemic Justification Inventory. In the following, a few reflections upon the three justification methods.
Choosing justification strategy may also involve choosing your authorities. Justification by authority may require that we trust – or are forced to trust – the agent conveying the information. ‘Agent’ denoting that the information source can be either a human or an artificial agent.
In an open and honest environment or society, the question of authority is perhaps less problematic. The authorities play with open cards, and individuals are free to choose whom they trust. In today’s world the question may be more complicated. Content is increasingly being produced by various AI tools, and the more the AI tools learn, the more “human” do their texts appear, and the more difficult it is for the reader to assess and identify the epistemic agent behind the testimony.
Whom we choose as our authority, and why, is beyond the scope of this blog, but for instance Alasuutari’s (2018) categorisation provides interesting tools for thought that we may use, for instance, for reflecting upon why some people believe in a charismatic authority maintaining that “…in xxx they’re eating dogs and cats”.
The second strategy, justifying one’s knowledge by personal reasoning, requires both previous knowledge and the ability to reason logically and to draw logical conclusions. Further, it requires the ability to assess whether or not one’s previous knowledge is sufficient for carrying out the reasoning required. When it comes to personal reasoning, there is a special challenge in the increasing individualistic attitudes stating that “my view is just as justified and valuable as any”. This may perhaps be seen as a form of epistemic injustice (below) where individuals afford themselves an excessive level of credibility.
The third strategy, consulting and comparing multiple sources, is basically a familiar scholarly principle. Still, it requires that the selected sources illuminate the issue from several perspectives, which is necessarily not the case for instance if the user does not properly evaluate the sources offered by a search engine. Albeit multiple sources corroborating each other may be a scholarly principle, we also need to pay attention to those sources or agents. Repeating a statement will eventually (depending on context) make the statement appear as a truth. If the information is (marketed as) overwhelming, we tend to passive acceptance (MacKenzie et al., 2021). In social media, it is important to realise that likes and shares are commonly used, and regarded as a kind of social validation. They are, however, only spontaneous and subjective reactions and therefore, they cannot be equated with scientific validation (Sahut & Tricot, 2017).
The justification model above does not consider that individuals are not always rational but instead, cognitive processing seems to be subordinated to emotional processing (see, e.g., Angel & Seitz, 2024). Further, there are features in today’s epistemic environment that complicate the picture. For instance, Kalpokas (2019, p. 14) notes that “… in the post-truth environment, ‘truth’ is what works in a particular situation, i.e. that which enables making sense of oneself and the environment in a positively enabling way”. We can see authoritarian leaders re-writing history and presenting their citizens with a fictional narrative that serves their own purposes. According to Herzog (2023, pp. 12, 104), many of the challenges we are facing can be traced back to how the web is conceptualized as a “marketplace of ideas” without any need for regulation. For instance, the way an idea or a presidential candidate is marketed and advertised (the package) seems to weigh more than the idea itself or what the candidate stands for (the content).
How individuals choose their justification method(s) is a research topic that should be explored extensively. The results of a pilot study among first-year students indicate that the source of testimony seems to have a stronger impact than the type of information on the choice of justification method (Ståhl, 2024b). How emotional elements may have affected the choices should be further explored.
Epistemic and testimonial (in)justice
In a previous subsection I highlighted testimony as the most important source of information. Consistently, we also need to consider how individuals deal with the testimonies they receive, that is, do they afford them the appropriate level of credibility? Epistemic injustice is a concept originally coined by Miranda Fricker and in this text, I limit myself to testimonial injustice. Testimonial injustice is based on unfair prejudices against a speaker or the group they (are thought to) represent. Testimonial injustice results in “… the speaker receiving more credibility than [they] otherwise would have – a credibility excess – or […] receiving less credibility […] – a credibility deficit” (Fricker, 2007, p. 17). In the original definition, Fricker focussed on credibility deficit but, for instance, Medina (2011, p. 16) suggests taking a broader view of epistemic injustices, and further points out that an excessive epistemic trust given to the speaker will affect everybody involved in the interaction and cause them epistemic harm (Medina, 2011, pp. 18–19).
In the web context it is especially important to acknowledge the possibility of credibility excess, which may easily occur if the user lacks sufficient media literacy and simply accepts what is conveyed, for instance, in the first source of a hit list (cf. MacKenzie et al., 2021). In these cases, we are not dealing with unfair prejudices but the opposite, undeserved authority.
I hope the description above provides a picture of how testimony, justification for knowing, and epistemic justice are entangled, and how these concepts can contribute to research how individuals build their knowledge in the contemporary era of online interactions, AI, post-truth and fake news. The ability to assess the information we receive is, after all, the foundation of, and a basic pre-requisite for participation in, a democratic society.
Text by Tore Ståhl
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