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# If solidarity is the answer, what was the question?

## - *Thick and thin solidarity and embedded conceptions of individual responsibility*

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There has been suggestions of having the notion of solidarity as the foundational value for welfare scheme reforms. Solidarity has been an emerging concept especially in bioethical deliberations emphasizing the need for value-oriented discussion in revising healthcare structures. On the one hand, the notion can be understood as a certain pre-institutional and pre-contractual sense of social cohesion, on which just societies can be built on. On the other hand, solidarity can be contrasted with liberal justice and “passive” solidarity of administrative welfare schemes that, according to criticism, focus on mere distribution with anonymous bureaucracy. The notion suffers from a theoretical and normative unclarity.

In this paper, I discuss the conceptual and normative roles that solidarity is supposed to play. If solidarity is the answer, what was the question? It seems that for the champions of solidarity, the main motivation is the dissatisfaction with all-encompassing individualism and a lack of social cohesion of interconnectedness in the society. The failure to recognize the social nature of human beings, and the narrow focus on distribution, are seen as threats to welfare structures, while solidarity is offered as the saviour. However, this criticism, directed mostly to liberal justice, seems to be out of place. A more appropriate target is the “American” bioethics, which has been widely criticized for being mostly concerned on individual autonomy and individual rights and embedding questionable metaphysical and normative assumptions on individuals. I argue that a highly thin level of solidarity, that is, a mere recognition of human beings as social creatures in schemes of social cooperation, affected by varying social contexts, is a sufficient level to answer the critique.

However, the suggestions for taking account solidarity are thick and normative in many ways. I will argue that thicker accounts of solidarity bring about normative and conceptual effects that seem to be incompatible with the original aims of strengthening the notion. These untoward effects include the responsabilisation of the individual, entailing asymmetric, exclusionist, and moralistic tendencies. The concept of solidarity, when tried to applied to the thick and normative policy-making level, entails inner tensions that are likely to hijack untoward measures and tendencies into the discussion.

The wish to increase interconnectedness and the sense of belonging of people in the society is more likely done by strengthening relational equality of people and decreasing socioeconomic inequalities, as studies suggest – not by focusing on individual senses. Solidarity may be regarded as the social and cultural infrastructure of justice, but this does not give any reason to diminish frameworks of liberal justice.

## **Minimal Self, Narrative Self, and Person: A Husserlian Account of Selfhood**

In contemporary study of selfhood it is commonplace to distinguish between two senses of self, namely minimal self and narrative self. Minimal self is described as pre-reflective, tacit self-awareness that characterizes our waking life from early infancy onwards. As a defining feature of first-person perspective it provides a basic sense of “mineness” accompanying our changing experiences. Although based on bodily and affective sensations, minimal self lacks personal character, or at least a detailed personal history, reflective valuations and interpretation of one’s deeds, traits and social attributes. It is regarded as a basic sense or an invariant experiential feature at the core of more substantial and personal forms of selfhood.

Narrative self, on the other hand, is constituted in and through the stories we tell of ourselves and others tell of us. Both our individual self-interpretation and social understanding of ourselves provide us with more or less coherent and open-ended single narrative, in which something is included and something left out. Whereas minimal self remains stable, narrative self constantly evolves as our changing experiences, actions and ideals are integrated, evaluated and articulated in our life stories. Authors such as Taylor and MacIntyre have famously stressed ethical, temporal, communal, and linguistic nature of narrative self.

In this paper I will re-assess the distinction between minimal self and narrative self. The focus will be on two proponents of this dual or two-dimensional model of selfhood, Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher, who draw evidence from both phenomenological analysis and empirical studies on developmental psychology, pathologies and sense of agency. I shall argue that Zahavi and Gallagher’s account offers two compatible and complementary notions of self. Nevertheless, I claim their distinction falls short in three aspects. (1) Firstly, the notion of minimal self is too narrow to grasp the pre-reflective and pre-linguistic experiential dimension of selfhood in its fullest. (2) Secondly, their account fails to clarify the exact relation between minimal self and narrative self, as two different aspects or dimensions of selfhood. (3) Thirdly, there are features of personhood that go beyond minimal self but cannot be accounted for by narrative self without making the concept too inclusive.

In order to supplement Zahavi and Gallagher’s account I will turn to Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of personal identity and his concept of person (*Person*). Moreover, I claim his account of habitualities (*Habitualitäten*) and overall style (*Gesamtstil*) describe and account for personal features such as convictions, abiding interests, character traits, dispositions, and even some cognitive abilities and patterns of expressive behavior. There is a whole range of bodily, habitual, and cognitive traits, such as the way one walks, the manner of speaking, or how one remembers associatively, which are not intrinsically narrative in form, not to even mention linguistically articulated, but have personal character beyond the scope of minimal self. I claim these kinds of personal features are better grasped with a Husserlian concept of person than minimal self or narrative self. This enriched notion of selfhood offers us tools to analyze how the self is *both* passively constituted *and* actively shaped.

In this way, I claim that a Husserlian concept of person can serve as a bridging concept between minimal self and narrative self and highlight both their differences and entanglement. I hope to show that minimal self, person and narrative self can all play specific roles in differentiating, describing and integrating different aspects of selfhood. This is in line with Zahavi and Gallagher’s aim for a multidimensional account of selfhood.

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Title: **“Raising Awareness in Nature Aesthetics”**

### **Abstract**

Within the heritage of environmental aesthetics, the scenic appreciation of nature is influenced by the eighteenth-century notion of the picturesque and by the landscape model. These influences have consequences, such as the exclusive focus on the visual aspect of a landscape leaving out other elements such as the sounds, smells and other sensations one can experience in a natural environment.

In this article, I present a critique of the aesthetic appreciation of nature, mentioning some international environmental case as well as examples of the everyday life. Neglected for many years because understood as a mere context where events take place, the “everyday” is mentioned in this article as a revitalized concept that in the last years has witnessed a growing interest within philosophy and the aesthetics of everyday life which include the aesthetics qualities of living personal spaces such as houses, yards, gardens, design, architecture etc. The concept includes the daily choices and actions people make daily and the impact in human lives and the natural environment we are surrounded by.

Based on the criticism of the aesthetic evaluation of natural environments, I propose alternatives appreciation of nature based on the pre-knowledge of the natural history sciences, which can help to understand the features and the functions of natural elements, environments and ecosystems beyond their appearance. The scientific knowledge is a good point of departure to broaden people’s horizon on the richness and biodiversity of the natural world but it should be deepened by a personal engagement with nature, as the American philosopher Holmes Rolston III proposed (Rolston III 1998, 162). Among the natural history sciences, ecology can particularly help to display features and benefits of unattractive landscapes such wetlands and prairies, and species that are not aesthetically appealing to the great public such bats and Venus flytraps. Ecological knowledge can support the battle against the tyranny of the scenic landscape approach in the everyday experiences, prevalently visual, thus opening the way for supporting environmental protecting policies which do not prioritize beauty but health and well-being, not only for humans but for the whole earth ecosystem.

## **Madness is Somewhere Between Chaos and Having a Dream: Madness & Dream in Descartes's First Meditation**

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### **Abstract:**

At the beginning of the First Meditation of the *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descartes's meditator considers not only the famous scenarios of dreaming and deceiver but also a third scenario: that she might be *insane*. This *madness scenario* is then apparently rejected in favor of the dream scenario. But why is the scenario turned down and why is dreaming favorable to it as a reason for doubt? Better yet, if the madness scenario is almost immediately rejected, what purpose does it serve in the larger narrative of the First Meditation? Why even bring it up?

In the paper, I analyze the scenario of madness and its relation to the dream scenario, drawing on two questions: 1. Does the madness generate a convincing reason for doubt? & 2. What narrative purpose does the madness have in the tightly constructed First Meditation? Overall, the scenario of madness has been generally neglected and ignored, and it has received only minor discussion in the scholarly literature, almost all of which I take to be misguided. (E.g. Frankfurt 2008; Broughton 2002 & 2005; Ablondi 2007; Carriero 2009; Russo 2011; Christofidou 2013; Lennon & Hickson 2013.) For this reason, the whole scenario has mostly gone without well-driven attempts to place it in a larger narrative in the First Meditation. However, the scenario deserves to be discussed much more as it serves an important argumentative turning point in the narration of the First Meditation. I view the role of the madness paragraph to be *intermediary* and argue that the madness scenario acts as a transitional passage between the *natural* common sense attitude, used in practical everyday life, and the *unnatural* metaphysical doubt. These two should be considered two different *states of mind*, with the latter being the metaphysical attitude required for the Cartesian suspension of judgment.

I draw important differences between Descartes's handling of dreaming and lunacy which make madness *unconvincing* and *unreasonable* as a skeptical scenario. It is also possible that madness as a scenario would question a more restricted set of beliefs than dreaming. Thus madness fails as a reason for doubt, but it is included in the First Meditation because of its transitional intermediary role. Likewise, because of this role, madness also offers Descartes an ample opportunity to criticize those, including the traditional ancient skeptics, who include skepticism as part of their everyday life.

When the self feels unreal - the pathological case of Cotard syndrome  
as a challenge for theories of self-consciousness

In this paper, I will explore concepts of self-consciousness in relation to a rare pathological case of *Cotard syndrome*. Patients suffering from Cotard syndrome deny being alive, having body parts, thinking, existing, or being a self. In other words, patients feel that their selves have completely disappeared. These experiences seem to be in substantial contradiction with philosophical theories which claim that self-consciousness is a crucial feature of mind and thus, Cotard syndrome poses a challenge for these theories. I will analyze the abnormal self-consciousness of Cotard syndrome patients, striving for to clarify what exactly is disordered in their self-experience. At the same time, I aim at determining a conception of self-consciousness by means of which it is possible to explain also anomalous experience.

First, I briefly contemplate the ambiguities in the concept of self-consciousness. The most general conceptual distinction within self-consciousness is drawn between its two forms. *Minimal self-consciousness* is the most fundamental form of self-consciousness and a structural feature of experience: it refers to the *subjectivity* of experience, i.e. in it the *self* manifests itself *as the subject* of experience. *Reflective self-consciousness*, instead, is a capacity to take *oneself as the object* of one's reasoning and to think of oneself as oneself. However, this general distinction needs to be further elaborated in order to understand all subtleties of self-consciousness.

Second, I present pathological cases as a methodological tool to study the subtleties of self and focus on Cotard syndrome. Pathological cases can assist especially in capturing minimal self-consciousness which typically is a ubiquitous feature of experience and, arguably, becomes striking only when it gets disordered some way. I analyze different explanations for the delusions in Cotard syndrome by using Gallagher's (2013) *pattern theory of self* as a general theoretical framework, since different authors have explained Cotard syndrome by appealing to different aspects of the pattern theory. I propose that the major altered factor in Cotard syndrome is minimal self-consciousness, i.e. experiential aspects related to embodied and affective aspects, and that alterations in this low-level self-consciousness further induce changes in reflective self-consciousness. This resolution resembles Billon's (2016) interpretation according to which Cotard syndrome results from an attenuation of subjective character of experience, however, I suggest a conceptually slightly simpler account.

Third, I end the paper by summarizing how the studying of Cotard syndrome can assist in amplifying concepts of self-consciousness. The analysis of abnormal experience can help to detect the details of self and thus contributes to the elaboration of a generic theory. On the other hand, a theory of self-consciousness should be fine-grained enough to encompass all varieties of the phenomenon and is fortified by accounting for anomalous experience.

# Logicality and labelled calculi: a reductive approach to modal operators

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While many criteria of logicality have been proposed for propositional and standard quantified logics, non-classical logics such as modal logic have received little attention. From an inferentialist point of view, there is a good reason: the usual deductive systems for modal logic do not easily lend themselves to standard analysis which relies on harmony-type criteria. Labelled systems, on the other hand, are more suitable for this task. Their structure recovers the neat separation between properties of modal operators *per se* and particular conditions for the accessibility relation, which is explicit in relational semantics but lost in the usual (non-labelled) deductive systems.

My aim is to apply Schroeder-Heister's (2015) idea of a reductive analysis to propositional modal logic using labelled **G3K\*** sequent calculi. The basic idea of a reductive analysis is that the logicality of one set of operators is based on the logicality of another, more fundamental set of operators by the way of translation. The analogy between modal operators and quantifiers makes a case for using this tactic with modal logic. The structure of labelled derivations allows for relatively easy two-level translation from **G3K\***-rules into formulas of second-order propositional logic. The latter then serves as the metalogic in which the criteria of harmony, viewed as deductive equivalence, can be established.

# A FAMILY OF MODELS OF SHARED INTENTIONAL ACTION

Submission for *Graduate Conference of Doctoral Training Network in Philosophy 2016*

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In my contribution to the conference, I formulate a new meta-theoretical framework for mediating between the conceptual construals and ontological commitments of different philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. By *conceptual construals*, I mean the primitive conceptual elements and relations in terms of which shared intentional action, and its most important *explanans*, shared intention, is analysed or elucidated. By *ontological commitments*, I mean the representational relations that these conceptual elements and relations are taken to bear to the external world. Together with pragmatic and contextual considerations, spelling out such commitments and construals makes it possible to use philosophical accounts of shared intentional action in generating explanatory understanding of the social world that we live in. Given its capacity to navigate these features, the proposed framework can aid us in choosing the most appropriate philosophical account of shared intentional action in each set of circumstances, relative to our ends and concerns as theoreticians of the social world. Thus an important subsidiary goal of my framework is to support a pragmatic and pluralistic approach to the philosophical study of shared intentional action.

I pursue the aforementioned tasks by treating philosophical accounts of shared intentional action as *theoretical models*, which are in many respects similar to the kinds of models that are used in science (Giere 1988; 2004; Godfrey-Smith 2006). However, I do not seek to provide an explicit definition of what theoretical models are, or a systematic comparison of philosophical and scientific models. Rather, I explore this view by the nature of its consequences, and the repercussions that it has for a range of philosophical debates about the nature of shared intentional action, such as the conceptual reducibility of shared intention to individualistic building blocks, the ontological status of group agents, the benefits of top-down and bottom-up approaches to shared intentional action, and the intrinsic normativity of shared intention. Given a plausible description of how models represent the world, many conceptually different philosophical accounts of shared intentional action can be treated as broadly compatible with the same empirical phenomena. However, different philosophical accounts may have contrasting conceptual constraints and affordances, which bring about respective theoretical virtues and shortcomings. This can make the use of some philosophical accounts of shared intentional action preferable over others in particular theoretical circumstances, or in relation to particular theoretical goals.

Granted, most contemporary philosophers of shared intentional action have not previously thought of their accounts as theoretical models (but see Bratman 2014, 9; cf. Tuomela, 2013, 5). However, the meta-theoretical status of an account is arguably at least in part a function of the attitudes of the theoretician towards her theoretical constructs, rather than an upshot of their intrinsic features alone (Giere 2004). Thus I take myself to be in a position to argue that philosophical accounts of shared intentional action *can* be treated as models, and that they *ought* to be treated as models due to the significant benefits that this confers on philosophical discourse about the nature of shared intentional action. Most importantly, the proposed framework can be justified by its capacity to bring competing philosophical accounts of shared intentional action under a common framework, and to provide a partial constructive basis for choosing between different philosophical accounts of shared intentional action in different theoretical circumstances, and in relation to different theoretical goals. These can be regarded as aims that all philosophers of shared intentional action should be able to look forward to.

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## ***Ratione et via!* Four Instances on the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Leibniz**

Visa Helenius

### **Abstract:**

The paper is about Leibniz's conception on the principle of sufficient reason – hereafter the PSR. This principle claims, in a general sense, that every being in world exists for some reason. Then, for example, the birth of the universe, strikes of lightning, movements of the quantum particles and Donald Trump's decisions have sufficient reasons, which explain why these things exist and are as they are.

The PSR is powerful, theoretically complex and problematical principle. Anyhow, some philosophers have accepted the PSR, like Spinoza, Leibniz and early Kant. In modern times, the PSR is related along with philosophy, for example, in the areas of religion, quantum mechanics, psychology and cosmology. Because the PSR has a strong historical role and appearance but also a permanent existence in modern philosophy and science, then it must be to say that the PSR is both historical and modern object.

The paper examines Leibniz's views on the PSR. The first section gives some notices about, firstly, the role and meaning of the PSR in Leibniz's philosophy and, secondly, the problematality of this – the Leibnizian PSR seems to be incoherent. The second section introduces and analyses four important instances. The third section gives some remarks and suggestions how the Leibnizian PSR can be understood.

## SAFE AND VIRTUOUS

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### ABSTRACT:

A method-relativized version of the safety condition says that a subject S's true belief that  $p$ , which was gained through belief-formation method  $M$ , amounts to knowledge only if S could not easily have believed falsely that  $p$ , via  $M$ . The method relativization of the safety condition raises the question "how should we individuate methods of belief-formation?" The extension of safe beliefs will vary greatly depending on how broadly or narrowly we individuate methods of belief-formation. This is the so-called generality problem. The goal of this paper is to offer a solution to this problem. I will argue that only virtuously formed beliefs are in the market for knowledge and that we only have to identify when two virtuously formed beliefs are the same. By relativizing the safety condition to virtuous methods of belief-formation the prospects of answering the generality problem are far from bleak.

### **Self-Control in Responsibility Enhancement and Criminal Rehabilitation**

While conceptions of agential responsibility are diverse, it is plausible that self-control factors into them. Lately, philosophers such as Nicole Vincent, Elizabeth Shaw and Thomas Douglas have discussed the ethics of the possibility for criminal rehabilitation by means of enhancing or modifying the neurological makeup of the offender *as part of the criminal sanction*. According to some views, offenders could be made more responsible by improving their ability to fight morally questionable urges and act conscientiously. My criticism of these views draws from an understanding of self-control as an ability that can be constituted in a variety of ways. In many cases, the lack of self-control displayed in a convict's behavior is not due to any kind of neurobiological phenomenon, being caused by environmental factors. Therefore, behaviour therapy and other environment-based interventions are more likely to be successful, especially considering that these methods have also been proven successful in improving self-control in people whose self-control impairments *do* have neurobiological causes, such as people with ADHD. Secondly, the highly individual makeup of self-control and its impairments suggests that the criminal justice system is ill-equipped to decide on the precise character of intervention that is needed for rehabilitation. Therefore, whether a neurological intervention or an environmental one is required is better assessed by medical practitioners and social workers than by criminal court judges.

Graduate Conference for Doctoral Students in Philosophy,

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Alma Korke, University of Tampere

## **Comparison of Moore and Brentano, consciousness or intentional acts**

### **Abstract**

In my paper, I compare the theories which G. E. Moore (1873–1958) and Franz Brentano (1838–1917) have presented of consciousness or intentional act. I assert that Moore's consciousness and Brentano's intentional act mean the same. In my dissertation I study the influence of psychology into G. E. Moore's philosophy of mind. Moore studied in Cambridge where he was taught by G. F. Stout (1860–1944) who studied under Franz Brentano. For this reason, I compare Moore's and Brentano's view on consciousness and intentional acts. Today, Brentano's impact on 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy should be studied more than recently has been done. Brentano is mainly known of his teaching in University of Würzburg and of his publications on psychology.

First, I clarify psychology's position in Moore's philosophy. After that, I present Moore's theory of consciousness which he does in his second dissertation in 1898 and repeats it in his article "The Refutation of Idealism" 1903 (Moore 2011b, 161–162). Second, I am going to consider Brentano's view of the position of psychology in *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* 1874. Then I describe you Brentano's conception of intentional acts. Third, my aim is to compare the theories of Moore on consciousness and Brentano on intentional acts. In addition, I also want to clarify what is Brentano's influence on Moore so I assume that there is something which binds the theories of Brentano and Moore together.

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## Meanings as justifying reasons for action

I argue for one specific sense of the claim that meanings of linguistic expressions are normative: I argue that meanings can be justifying reasons for action.

The current debate on the normativity of meaning was set in motion by Saul Kripke's (1982) interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language argument, which was premised on the claim that meanings of linguistic expressions are normative. Several philosophers (e.g. Hattiangadi 2007, Miller 2012) have recently argued against Kripke's premise. They have argued that since meanings of linguistic expressions, considered alone, cannot entail all-things-considered oughts, meanings cannot be normative in any interesting sense.

In assessing the counterarguments, I apply the conceptual framework of *reasons for action*, which has been widely used in the study the nature of normativity in metaethics and in the philosophy of action. The concept of an *all-things-considered ought* is interchangeable with the concept of a *conclusive reason*: If and only if some action ought, all things considered, to be performed, then there is a conclusive reason to perform it. Additionally, I distinguish between *motivating* and *justifying* reasons. I discuss exclusively the question whether meanings can be justifying reasons for action.

The critics' conclusion is inferred from two premises: (P1) meanings of linguistic expressions are truth-apt (realism about meaning); and (P2) contents of any truth-apt statements, considered alone, are not sufficient to conclusively justify any particular action. Additionally, some statements about *values* must also be given as reasons in conclusively justifying an action (Humeanism about justifying reasons). The conclusion is that meanings of linguistic expressions, *considered alone*, are *not* sufficient to conclusively justify an action (*pace* internalism about meanings as reasons for action).

I agree with the critics' conclusion, but I argue that meanings can be normative in a weaker sense. I think of reasons as premises of practical inferences. A practical inference from meanings to any specific conclusion is always *defeasible*: the inference might be defeated by adding some further premise to the set of premises. However, *pace* the critics, adding *values* among the set of premises does not eliminate the defeasibility. What eliminates the defeasibility is the fact that when we give reasons for action, we implicate the validity of a *ceteris paribus* clause. A *ceteris paribus* clause expresses that no such considerations occur which would defeat the inference.

As Brandom (1998) notes, we should not think of a *ceteris paribus* clause a shorthand for the complete description of the context of an action. It expresses rather that the practical inference which it qualifies is valid in the particular context of the action only. The critics' argument fails, because it is still committed to the false premise that actions can be justified independently of the particular context of action.

If that is true, then there is no more robust sense in which a consideration can be normative than as being in the role of a reason for action in a particular context, in other words, given the validity of a *ceteris paribus* clause. Because meanings of linguistic expression can play this role, they are normative in the sense that they can be justifying reasons for action.

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## Kielen institutionaalisuudesta

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Dennis Preston (esim. 2003) on esittänyt empiiristen, "kansan kielikäsitteitä" koskevien tutkimustensa pohjalta, että ei-lingvisteille on tyypillistä ajatella kieliä itsenäisinä, abstrakteina olioina, jotka eivät palaudu kovinkaan suoraan yksilöiden mielenkäyttöihin tai kielenkäyttöön. Tässä käsityksessä nämä abstraktit kielet määrittävät "korrektin" tai oikean tavan käyttää kieltä, josta poikkeaminen tuottaa lepsua tai peräti virheellistä kielenkäyttöä. Vastaavasti lingvisteillä on Prestonin mukaan taipumus lähteä liikkeelle yksilöiden kielenkäytöstä ja ymmärtää jaettu kieli kielimuotona tai varieteettina, josta yksilöiden väliset erot on abstrahoitu pois. "Korrektius" ymmärretään tällöin sosiaalisena normina eli yhteisön jäsenten odotusten mukaisuutena, josta poikkeava käytös on mahdollisesti sanktioitu.

Kun tähän lingvistien individualistiseen näkemykseen liitetään ajatus kielen hyvin herkstä tilannekohtaisesta vaihtelusta, standardikieli (tai hyvä yleiskieli tai "kirjakieli") on helppo ymmärtää tietyissä julkisissa ja muodollisissa tilanteissa yhteisön tai mahdollisesti tietyn kielellisen eliitin käyttämäksi varieteetiksi. Tämän pohjalta on tavallista ajatella, että muiden varieteettien tavoin myös yleiskieli muotoutuu konvergoitumalla yksilöiden välisessä vuorovaikutuksessa ja kielenhuoltoinstituutit vaikuttavat vain kausaalisesti kielenkäyttäjien kielitajuun ja siten yleiskielen käyttöön.

Käyttäen esimerkkinä suomen kieltä ja Kotuksen suomen kielen lautakunnan asemaa esitän, ettei tällainen kausaalinen kuva ole riittävä, sillä kaikkia standardikielen ja sen muutoksen kysymyksiä ei voi ymmärtää ja selittää vain määräryhmän hallitseman varieteetin tai yhteisössä jaettujen kielellisten käsitysten, niin sanotun kieli-ideologioiden pohjalta. Erotan käsitteellisesti toisistaan toisaalta standardikielen varieteettina ja toisaalta yleiskielen standardin eli erilaiset kielen kodifioinnit tai muut kieltä koskevat säädökset ja käytänteet, joihin nojataan arvioitaessa tietynlaisen kielenkäytön korrektiutta. Yleiskielen standardit eivät jäännöksettä palaudu yksilöiden kielitajuun tai kielelliseen käyttäytymiseen eivätkä ne siten ole osa mitään varieteettia, joten täydellisessä kuvauksessa kielestä ne on otettava erikseen huomioon.

Tämän käsitteellisen erottelun pohjalta väitän, että esimerkiksi suomen kieli kytkeytyy yksilöiden hallitsemien varieteettien lisäksi suomalaisen yhteiskunnan institutionaaliin rakenteisiin: suomen kieltä konstituoivat yksilöiden sisäistäminen kielellisten (ns. luonnollisten) normien lisäksi tiettyjen auktoriteettien kieltä koskevat ratkaisut. Täten kielen ja sen muutoksen selitys tai kuvaus ei aina ole pelkästään kausaalinen, vaan se voi olla myös konstitutiivinen.

Teesini näyttäisi olevan mielenkiintoisella tavalla ristiriidassa monien sosiolingvistien ja kielenhuoltajien itseymmärryksen kanssa. Se on myös merkittävä askel pois suoraviivaisesta individualismista kohti toisaalta Prestonin luonnostelemaa kansan kielikäsitteitä ja toisaalta kielifilosofiassa suosittua eksternalismia. Väitteestäni näyttää seuraavan, että radikaalisti eksternalistiset tilanteet, joissa jokainen kieliyhteisön jäsen on väärässä, ovat periaatteessa mahdollisia mutta varsin marginaalisia.

## Climate Change, Social Structures and Moral Responsibility

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One of the most discussed topic in climate ethics has been whether there is such a thing as individual moral responsibility for climate change, and if there is, what would it be like. In my paper I argue that 1) the prevalent view in climate ethics is to model climate change as an unstructured collective action problem, and that this approach is mistaken, especially when it is used to explore issues of moral responsibility, 2) climate change should be seen as a structural problem in capitalist societies or world capitalism in general, 3) it is morally significant which way climate change is modelled, for different conceptions of responsibility will follow from different models.

If anthropogenic global warming is modeled as an unstructured collective action problem, it is supposed to have come about through the actions of billions of individuals, but the individuals do not form a structured collective with a decision procedures and chain of command that could be blamed as a collective. No individual as such could be blamed, for their individual emissions contribute to any harms caused by climate change through a very complex causal chain and only in concert with many other emitters. Any single emitter could not by themselves make any difference to the global problem. And where we could hold individual members of a structured collective, such as the Nazi Party, morally accountable owing to their avowed membership, we cannot say the same with climate change, since there are no membership cards for the carbon emissions club.

My view, in contrast, is that climate change is a structural problem. Individuals are not disparate but they are embedded in social and cultural contexts where social structures constrain and make possible different practices. Our societies in global capitalism are structured in ways where interdependent collective practices produce global warming. From this it may still follow that generally any one individual should not be blamed for climate change, but the picture of individual responsibility that emerges is much more nuanced, since individuals, their preferences and capacities of knowledge and action, are shaped by the social context in which they make their ways and live their lives. In addition, hierarchies and disparities of social and economic power are an internal part of social structures, which means that different individuals in different social positions have a different relation of responsibility to the problem of climate change.

Iris Marion Young's (2006; 2011) "social connection model of responsibility" seems like a promising starting point for understanding responsibility for climate change, but whereas Young argues that the social connection model implies only forward-looking responsibility, I suggest that with climate change it also makes sense to discuss retrospective responsibility in the case of the global elite (c.f. Sayer 2015).

## Abstract: Deliberative Democracy and the Politics of Embodied Presence

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Deliberative democratic theory has during the last 20 years risen to prominence as one of the main normative models of democracy on the field of political theory. During this time its normative presuppositions have been under constant critique and revision. Deliberative democracy holds non-coercion, or ruling out ‘all external or internal coercion other than the force of the better argument’ as one of the fundamental starting points of legitimate democratic processes. This focus on communication as non-coercion has resulted in the decidedly abstract and disembodied character of deliberative theory that makes it difficult to relate deliberative politics to real-life social movements, even if deliberative theorists working in the tradition of Critical Theory have been repeatedly attempting to bring their concerns under the deliberative-discursive rubric. Despite the efforts of critical deliberative theorists, a gap remains between the idea of deliberation as abstract linguistic exchanges of reason and the very concrete exclusions from deliberation, perpetuated by the effects of unjust social relations in the deliberative capacities of different social groups.

To break the theoretical deadlock, I propose that we must start paying attention to the embodied negative social experiences of the groups that are otherwise erased from the public eye. I discuss the concept of embodied negative social experience as a mediating category between individual deliberative subjects suffering from structural injustice and the embodied presence of bodies as communication, acting concretely and in concert to make visible injustices that a deliberation presupposing symmetrical moral respect as already obtaining is unable to let in. Without this theoretical focus on embodied experience and presence, deliberative theory will never be able to make the connection between the ‘coercive’ embodied politics of the street and politics as reasoned debate in the discursive public sphere, and will be worse off for it. If the ultimate aim of democratic theory is supposed to be greater justice, a deliberative democracy of disembodied communication will continue to lack a fundamental set of tools for working towards it.



## Fine and Epistemology of Essence

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Kit Fine has a famous and influential division between constitutive and consequential essences that many followers have adopted in their metaphysics of essence. However, the details of his theory of essence is not widely discussed. The key characterization of essence for Fine is to identify it with “a collection of propositions that are true in virtue of [an object’s] identity” (Fine 1995, 275) or “a class of properties that it essentially has” (Fine 1994a, 66). This kind of characterization raises problems right from the beginning: for example, it seems that he already assumes essences to be distinct from the objects themselves. I will focus on the epistemological consequences his view about essences brings along.

In the Aristotelian tradition, essences have not only played a part as metaphysical building blocks of reality but they have also explained how we are capable of knowing reality. When giving an account of our knowledge of essences, one needs to be capable of answering at least the following questions: How do we know essences? Do we know both essences of individuals and kinds – and if so, do they have different epistemological status? One can also further ask how we recognize propositions that are “true in virtue of the identity of an object” as opposed to other propositions about the object which happen to be true.

These are the central questions I want to analyze in Fine’s theory. Firstly, as he takes essences to be sets of propositions, I will ask how one could explain our knowledge of essences via propositions? Secondly, as he seems to consider only individual essences (Fine 1994a: 1994b; 1995), I will consider how general or kind essences could fit into this picture (if at all)? Thirdly, I will ask what kind of problems the assumption that essences are further objects will bring along? I will claim that Fine is led into troubles in all of these three areas.

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# Structural Exploitation in Compulsory Education: Securing Positional Advantages at the Expense of Others

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## Abstract

This paper (1) analyses the concept of structural exploitation and (2) applies it to the practical context of compulsory education.

(1) Recent philosophical research on exploitation has focused mainly on interactional exploitation, that is, exploitative agent-to-agent interactions. By contrast, researchers have examined much less structural exploitation, the idea that some social structures themselves can be exploitative. In this paper, I define structural exploitation as a social-structural process in which advantages are unfairly funnelled to some parties at the expense of others. Further, I define social structures as ‘exploitative in themselves’, if they have a propensity to produce such funnelling. The paper argues that such funnelling of advantages can sometimes occur also through interactional exploitation and thus interactional and structural exploitation are often intertwined in practice.

(2) To clarify the concept of structural exploitation, I apply it to the practical context of compulsory education. Schooling of children constitutes a significant societal institution that together with other social structures can produce unfair distributions of burdens and benefits across children and families. Social-structural processes such as school segregation can distribute educational opportunities unevenly and morally arbitrarily across children. While previous research has analysed justice issues related to schooling, it has only rarely utilized in these analyses the concept of interactional exploitation, and still less that of structural exploitation. Yet structural exploitation distinguishes a form of unfairness of its own in which some parties gain unfairly at the expense of others owing to social-structural reasons. In schooling this can occur, since children’s opportunities can be interconnected in a loosely zero-sum manner. Schooling is, to wit, a positional good: the competitive value of child’s schooling depends partly on how good schooling the child gets vis-à-vis others. Hence, the worse schooling of others benefits the privileged in the competition on further positional advantages such as desired jobs or places in the further education.

Examining schooling as a positional good reveals how exploitation can occur in unfairly structured school systems: positional advantages can be unfairly taken or received at the expense of others. This type of exploitation I term positional exploitation and further divide it into two subcategories in accordance with the division between interactional and structural exploitation. In the interactional case, positional advantages are taken unfairly at the expense of others through direct agent-to-agent interactions. In the structural case, a social-structural process such as segregated schooling unfairly funnels – in a loosely zero-sum manner – positional advantages to some children and families at the expense of others. This paper analyses the interconnectedness of these two forms of positional exploitation.

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## The Significance of Kant's Idea of "Radical Evil"

Kant is a characteristically modern philosopher, and his influence to virtually every significant 20<sup>th</sup> philosophical current has been enormous to the extent that there are few if any major issues in Kant's corpus that would be generally deemed outdated today. Also Kant's theory of radical evil has often been assessed as a forerunner of contemporary secular discussion of evil, because Kant was probably the first modern philosopher to discuss extensively about evil as a purely moral concept independently of theology.

However, apart from some recent Kant-scholars such as Sharon Anderson-Gold, Pablo Muchnik and Philip Rossi, few have studied carefully the exact meaning of Kant's theory to contemporary discussion – we might still share essentially the same central presumptions with Kant when taking evil as a legitimate moral concept. I argue that there are two intertwined ideas in the theory of radical evil that are still widely shared in contemporary discussion on evil – including the problems therein well pointed out already by Nietzsche.

The first idea is to locate evil strictly in moral will arguing that a propensity to evil is a necessary property of human will if morally good action is to be conceived praiseworthy. The same argument works also against scientifically oriented naturalistic criticism of the concept of evil; it is evident that evil actions can also be explained from various scientific viewpoints, but that does not mean that the moral qualities of acts such as evil can be reduced to scientific explanations. The second idea is that moral willing does not consist merely in isolated acts without any final goal, but in order to be able to act morally we need to believe that our acts ultimately cohere with the acts of others and make the world a better place so to speak. An essential aspect of evil is from this viewpoint is that it scatters what morally good actions build. Even if factual teleology of history is generally seen as an outdated idea, Kant's argument of teleology as a necessary "regulative idea of reason" might not be easy to surpass if the concept of evil is taken seriously.

Sartre's "l'Imaginaire" and possible consequences to the Mental Imagery debate.

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For Sartre, imagination is one of the basic ways of the mind to be turned towards the world. In *l'Imaginaire*, he describes it as a broad phenomenon including the seeing of a man in a simple cartoon, the seeing of faces in stains on a wall, hypnagogic phenomena, vague sketches hovering in the mind while thinking about abstract things and bodily longing of the hands of a beloved.

Contrary to Sartre's inclusive perspective, the Anglo-American Mental Imagery debate has concentrated on more restricted topics like problem solving with images by mental rotation and mental scanning. Since Sartre is often mentioned as a notable antirepresentationalist thinker, and as a critique of a mental picture theory of mental imagery, the question arises, if Sartre could offer something fruitful to the MI debate.

However, it seems that Sartre's criticism of mental representation goes half-way. Particularly problematic is his use of the term "analogon" which goes against Sartre's own aim which is to describe the experience of imagining without referring to any objectlike mental entity or representation. Sartre stresses that there is in his experience no representation of his friend Pierre. His consciousness is directed towards the only Pierre, Pierre in his totality ("Pierre tout court"). Obviously, no "analogon" is needed here. Anthony Hatzimoysis (2011, 96-97) has recently presented similar criticism of the "analogon" in Sartre.

Typically, in the Anglo-American mental imagery discussion, an image cannot state facts or have truth value. Therefore mental images are not accepted as thinking. The situation is seen quite in the opposite for Sartre: for him the seeing of images is fundamental for our mental life. For Sartre, thinking and imagery are sometimes close, even inseparable. The "analogon" may be a serious problem in Sartre's philosophy of mental imagery but it shouldn't hinder us from seeing that the Anglo-American discussion might profit of a more tolerant view on what thinking is.

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## KANT AND THE OBJECTIVITY PROBLEM OF SENSATION

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In the beginning of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant writes the following, concerning sensation: "The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation." (A 20/B 34.) Later in the book he defines sensation in relation to cognition: "A perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation (sensation); an objective perception is a cognition (cognition)." (A 320.)

Based on these definitions it seems rather clear that, for Kant, a sensation is something that objects cause or affect in us, the subjects. Nevertheless, Kant says, sensations do not refer to any object but only to the subject, namely as modifications of the subject's states. It is exactly here that we find the relevant meaning for the terms *objective* and *subjective*: objective is something (a representation) that refers or points to an object, whereas subjective means something that only refers to the subject. Now, even though our basic faculty for being able to be affected by objects and thus to represent them is sensibility, sensations are still only effects brought about in the subject (as a modification) by the object, and thus something that do not refer to any object.

Considering all of the above, it can strike one as a very surprising fact that in both the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* and on his lectures on metaphysics, Kant indeed speaks of *objective sensation*. This raises questions, such as: was Kant contradicting himself? Did he change his conception of sensation at some point? How could a sensation be objective, if it is, by definition, such a modification of the subject's states which does not refer to any object? Kant writes: "The green color of the meadows belongs to objective sensation, as perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness belongs to subjective sensation, through which no object is represented, i.e., to feeling, through which the object is considered as an object of satisfaction (which is not a cognition of it)." (Kant, 5:206)

In this paper I address Kant's conception of sensibility, focusing especially on the concept of objective sensation, and the problematicity of it. I claim that there need not be any real contradiction in Kant's concept of objective sensation, even with regard to some of his claims in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. However, it is necessary to clarify, firstly, which sensations can or cannot be objective, and secondly, the way in which they can be objective. I will achieve this by clarifying Kant's use and definition of *objective* and *subjective* with regard to referentiality, or object-directedness. In addition, I show the way in which *the distinction of primary and secondary qualities* is highly beneficial in understanding Kant's views on the objectivity of sensation.

According to my reading, it is Kant's thought that only via sensibility, in other words *a posteriori*, can we have experience referring to objects and knowledge concerning them. There are, however, *a priori* conditions to what can even possibly be experienced and known. These *a priori* conditions of experiencing objects are at the same time conditions of the existence of objects. Thus we know beforehand that all objects we may encounter must and will have certain properties, even if we obviously cannot know their exact nature prior to the encounter. My claim is that those properties which the objects will and must have, based on the *a priori* forms of sensibility, are the primary qualities of the objects. These properties make up or determine the *empirical thing in itself*. The secondary qualities, on the other hand, are produced in us upon the encounter, but are in no way necessary for the existence of the objects.

When encountering objects, they cause sensations in us. My claim is that those sensations (or parts of sensations) that, as part of a cognition, refer to the primary qualities of the objects, are objective. Accordingly, those sensations that do not refer to the primary spatiotemporal qualities of the objects are subjective. Thus these secondary qualities are not actual properties of the objects, but only modifications of the subject.

# ON VERITIC AND REFLECTIVE LUCK OF PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS

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**ABSTRACT:** We argue that the logic of perception developed by Hintikka can be used to explicate some of the central issues in contemporary epistemology, namely the safety condition and the ways in which perceptual knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck. According to a mainstream formulation of the safety condition a subject's belief is safe, if and only if, it is true in all the nearby possible worlds where the subject has that very same belief. According to the modal account of luck, developed by Pritchard, a belief is luckily true if and only if it is true in the actual world but false in a wide range of nearby possible worlds.

On our construal a belief is safe if and only if the perspectival and the physical world-line familiar from the logic of perception coincide in nearby possible worlds while a belief is luckily true just in case the perspectival world-line of the subject diverges from the physical world-line to a sufficient degree. Furthermore, by defining epistemic luck by using Hintikka's world-lines, we can distinguish between two kinds of harmful epistemic luck, which Pritchard labels veritic luck and reflective luck. A belief suffers from veritic luck just in case the perspectival and physical world-line diverge within the space of nearby possible worlds, whereas a belief suffers from reflective luck if the physical and perspectival world-lines diverge when we quantify over all possible worlds. We will demonstrate that the safety condition is incompatible with veritic luck, but compatible with reflective luck. As imperfect epistemic agents we will always fall short of the highest epistemic standards that the skeptic holds onto. We find this result welcome, since the demands that the skeptic places on us are often unreasonable. Having reliably formed true beliefs is enough for our practical purposes.

Moreover, we argue that our definition of reflective luck is preferable to Pritchard's definition. Unlike Pritchard, we don't rearrange the space of possible worlds nor do we mention other epistemic notions than 'belief' in our definition of reflective luck. Thus our approach is preferable to Pritchard's, both in terms of simplicity and explanatory power since we are in a position to pursue reductive analyses of epistemic notions in terms of reflective luck.

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## **From Extended Cognitivism to Enactivism**

The *Extended Mind* thesis (EM) (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998) claims that the vehicles of cognition can be extended across brain, body, and world. The *Extended Conscious Mind* thesis (ECM) (e.g. Noë 2004; Ward 2012) adds that in addition to cognition, also the vehicles of conscious experience can be spread in the same way. ECM does not follow directly from EM. Whilst EM is (usually) carried out from the premises of the *cognitivist* approach, I argue that ECM is better understood in terms of *enactivism*. ECM becomes more plausible a view if we abandon the cognitivist background assumptions of EM, and instead embrace enactivist view about the mind.

Andy Clark, besides being the inventor and best-known proponent of EM, is also a devoted opponent of ECM. He understands cognition in terms of computation that involves (mental) representations. From his premises, it is not very surprising that phenomenal consciousness is not allowed to extend. However, enactivist cognitive science is quite far from Clark's extended cognitivism. It refutes the *input–output picture* of the mind (see Hurley 1998), where perception is input from world to mind, and action is output from mind to world. ECM fits well with enactivism's commitment to the embodiment thesis and its denying of the epiphenomenality and isolatedness of consciousness. Enactivism creates a thoroughly different premise for ECM.

From the enactivist viewpoint, the material basis or the *vehicles* of experience are not considered simply as material objects but rather as a specific kind of organization. So the question is not about the vehicles themselves, but the way they are organized. Accordingly, the concepts 'internal' and 'external' are misleading since enactivism is not looking so much for the *spatial boundaries* of the mind as the *operational limits* of the system (see Virgo et al. 2011).

Thus enactivism gives two important outcomes regarding extended experience. First, it is a framework where the notion of the extension of phenomenal experience becomes more plausible and unambiguous (as opposed to cognitivist–computational framework), and it challenges the straightforward distinction between the vehicle and the content of experience.

## **Adorno on the Third Antinomy**

Freedom, determinism, and the position of the composer

In my paper I examine Theodor W. Adorno's metacritique of freedom in *Negative Dialectics*. Adorno criticizes Immanuel Kant's concept of freedom, which Kant presents in the Third Antinomy of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. I shall also focus on the concept of freedom presented in the other *Critiques*.

In the Third Antinomy Kant asks a cosmological question about determinism and freedom. He contrasts the thesis ("Causality according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality operating to originate the phenomena of the world. A causality of freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena.") with its antithesis ("There is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world happens solely according to the laws of nature."). Kant says that we fall into these kinds of antinomical contradictions when we try to extend the concepts of reason to the world itself. There is always a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Kant's project is to make metaphysics possible by constructing philosophy in such a way that there is no need for dogmatic certainty of things of which there can only be antinomies.

Adorno, however, asks "why have the two theses, 'The will is free' and 'The will is unfree,' become an antinomy?". He thinks that modern subjects have reasons to see themselves as both free and unfree, and the Third Antinomy expresses this contradictory experience. Also, for Adorno it is impossible to consider this issue as an abstraction. Kant tries to reify one particular experience in his conception of freedom, but Adorno sees freedom always conditioned by our social and historical situation. The idea of contradictions, which can be real in historical reality although logic excludes them, is inherited from Hegel. In the analysis presented in *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno aims to uncover Kant's reified social experience.

My final agenda is to apply this discussion in the area of music by focusing on the contradiction between the causal demands of material and the free will of the composer. Adorno thinks that "[t]he dissolution of everything pre-established has not resulted in the possibility of disposing freely over all material and technique". The artist who ignores the demands of the material, leaves the compositional process to the mercy of blind historical forces. In this matter, Adorno continues the debate between Kant and Hegel.



## The Potential Value of Present-Centered History of Science

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In this paper, I defend present-centered (or simply presentist) approach to the history of science. From the presentist point of view the history of science is (and should be) a study of past practices that have led to the present science. In other words, the history of science is a study of practices and episodes that were causally relevant to the formation of what is now known as science<sup>1</sup>. We can use Lorraine Daston's words as a guideline to the presentist approach: "[the historians of science] must explain how [the distinctive] character [of science] crystallized out of practices, both intellectual and manual, designed for other purposes". (Daston 2009, 807). Nick Tosh (see 2003) is also a notable defender of this approach. According to Tosh, the history of science is a study of past activities ancestral to modern science. I add to the presentist approach one crucial feature: it is the task of the philosophy of science to tell which parts of scientific activities are such that the study of their developments improves our understanding in the most significant way.

This paper has three interrelated aims. First aim is to argue that the presentist approach can bring unity to the shattered field of the history of science that is sometimes confusing in its heterogeneity for the non-specialist consumers of the history of science and even for the scholars in the related fields. The argument is that by collectively negotiating which features of the present science are significant and then studying the history of these features the historians are able to make the conclusions of their studies more meaningful and understandable for other scholars and for the wider audiences outside the specialist circles. The second aim is to establish that by using presentist approach the historians of science are able to provide explanations that are close relatives to our everyday explanations and thus we shall see that the historical understanding does not differ significantly from the more familiar kind of understanding. In presentist approach historical explanations and everyday causal explanations are made to match each other neatly. The third aim is to argue that presentist approach, if formulated with care, cannot be dismissed by using a set of standard arguments that have been used against it.

Three questions arise: 1. Which practices count as scientific at present? The answer to this question defines on which causal histories the historians of science should focus. 2. Why should the philosophers of science be able to tell what historians should study and how can they do this? In other words, what do we gain by listening to philosophers? 3. What does it mean to say that some past practice was causally relevant to the present science? Answering this question requires that one is able to explicate some notion of causality that is useful in the study of the history of science.

**ABSTRACT:**  
**The Point of Alief**

Tamar Gendler introduces the new mental state concept “alief” in two articles, “Alief and Belief” and “Alief in Action” (2008). Aliefs are certain kinds of mental states possessed by humans and other animals; they are “innate or habitual propensities to respond to (possibly accurate) apparent stimuli in ways that are associative and automatic” (Gendler 2012a, 763). Paradigmatic alief is an automatic mental reaction that has a representational, an affective and a behavioural component. The concept is introduced to be used in folk psychological discussion side by side with propositional attitudes like belief, desire and imagination, i.e. when we are looking for answers to questions concerning cognitive or psychological states of an individual like “why did the person act that way”.

Belief and desire are traditionally argued to form a pair that suffices to explain our intentional behaviour. Alief is similarly introduced to help to explain intentional behaviour, but the need for a concept like alief is most obvious when the intentionality of the action is somehow fuzzy. Gendler introduces the concept of alief via different kinds of examples from everyday life, where explaining action with traditional propositional attitudes would easily lead us astray.

The concept of alief has been criticized quite a bit. The most common argument against alief is that the notion is useless, because traditional mental state concepts, mainly belief, can do the job Gendler argues alief is for (Currie & Ichino 2012, Hubbs 2013, Kwong 2012, Mandelbaum 2013 and Muller & Bashour 2011). What is common to the articles criticizing the notion alief is that they concentrate on the examples of norm-discordant aliefs Gendler gives.

In my presentation I will show that this argument misses the point of alief, and ignores the main motivation for introducing it: The fact that to some part of our cognitive/mental/psychological states we have direct access to (our explicit attitudes or conscious mental states), and to some part we don't (implicit attitudes or non-conscious mental states). This is something psychological tests have proven in hundreds of studies, and it is not unfamiliar from our everyday phenomenology. If asked, people can tell if they e.g. believe or desire something (or tell if they are unsure), but they don't have same kind of access to other part of their mental states. The basic claim of alief is that these two categories differ in more ways than in just our capability to notice and articulate them. It argues that (at least one type of) the non-conscious part are automatic reactions some stimulus activate, and they are inherently affect-laden and include activation of behavioural patterns. Gendler calls them aliefs. Traditionally concepts like belief, desire or imagination refer either only to explicit attitudes or to both explicit and implicit attitudes. Thus they offer no help in studying the distinction and the features of the mental states type that we don't have direct access to. Alief is what Gendler suggests will help us do exactly that.