

# Congress for Doctoral Researchers in Philosophy 24-26.10.2022, Tampere University

by Finnish doctoral training network in philosophy

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Teemu Tauriainen (JYU): Revised Notion of Discourse Domains for the Truth Pluralists

Katja Tiisala (HU): A Sentio-centric Duty to Dematerialise Welfare

Markus Weckström (HU): Life as a Kuhnian Anomaly

**All 23, HU: 8, JYU: 5, OU: 0, TAU: 8, TU: 2, ÅA: 0**

# **An Economics-Centered Approach to the Problems of External Validity and Extrapolation**

**Sofia Blanco Sequeiros and Luis Mireles-Flores**

**10.10.2022**

In this paper, we study generalization and extrapolation in economics. We focus on the concept of external validity, or the concept that many economists use to describe generalizability. We argue that its role in extrapolative reasoning in economics is richer than philosophers of science have previously presented it. We also argue that a more nuanced understanding of the concept and its use will have positive consequences for the way philosophers understand uncertainty in experimental evidence as well as extrapolation.

First, we give an overview of the philosophical literature on extrapolation and external validity. We discuss the difference between extrapolation and external validity, and present the main critiques that philosophers of science have aimed at thinking about experimental evidence with the concept of external validity. We show that there are two definitions of external validity at play in the literature, and that philosophers have tended to use external validity synonymously with naive extrapolation rather than in the original, more explorative sense. This has affected the way philosophers understand extrapolation and its justification.

We use two policy interventions from economics as examples to show that practicing scientists use external validity to evaluate their experimental evidence, not as a naive form of extrapolation. We show that analyzing evidence with the concept of external validity contributes to understanding the nature and quality of the experimental evidence and of the causal relationships being studied. We conclude that understanding the concepts of external validity and extrapolation in a nuanced way has positive consequences for the epistemological and methodological analysis of evidence, its production and its evaluation.

Abstract for Congress for Doctoral Researchers in Philosophy 2022 in the Mon 24 – Wed 26 October 2022 in Tampere University.

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Virtue Ethics and Anarchist Prefiguration

My paper would concern the virtue ethical aspect of my doctoral dissertation *Possibilities and Limits of Materialism for Virtue Ethical Anarchism* (working title) from prefiguration's point of view. Prefiguration, the principle that means must embody the ends, has become one of the main features of both theory and practice of radical emancipatory socialism and it has been especially associated with anarchism. By anarchism is here meant the philosophical, political, and social movement and tradition which was one of the main strands, alongside Marxism, of the emerging socialist working-class movement in the 19th century. Philosophically, Benjamin Franks has most consistently argued for explicit connection between virtue ethics, as developed by Alasdair MacIntyre, and anarchism. My focus on the congress paper is to present Franks' argument which sees prefiguration as a major shared concept between virtue ethics and anarchism which is most fully detailed in his recent monograph *Anarchisms, Postanarchisms and Ethics* (2020). I will compare Franks' understanding of the concept of prefiguration with other accounts, anarchist or close to it, arguing explicitly or implicitly for prefiguration from other than virtue ethical standpoints such as Todd May's poststructuralist and consequentialist anarchist theory, especially his landmark work *The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism* (1994), and Paul Raekstad and Sofa Saio Gradin's recent general account of the topic in their *Prefigurative Politics* (2020).

Abstract for the Congress for Doctoral Researchers in Philosophy 2022

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## **Collective identities as instruments of justice**

Social movements built around different collective identities are today central actors in many societal struggles. In social philosophy, theory of recognition has been one of the most influential strands in seeking to conceptualize these struggles. Critics of recognition theories, and so called ‘identity politics’ in general, have however expressed concerns that politics centred around collective identities leads to problematic reification of identities. Another point of criticism is that recognition theories seem to lead to the conclusion that protection of any kind of collective identity can be considered valuable from the point of view of justice, regardless of the content of that identity.

In my talk I present an account of collective identities as (potential) ‘instruments’ for advancement of social justice through recognition struggles. I argue that it is possible to view social movements that are organized around collective identities as important and even necessary for the advancement of justice, and at the same time to refrain from committing to essentialism about the identities themselves or considering protecting them to be a requirement of justice.

The crucial point of this view is that collective “identity-based” struggles stem from shared experiences of discrimination rather than some common identity preceding those experiences. The aim of these struggles properly understood is to change social conditions so that individuals are redeemed from discrimination, and not a positive valuation of any identity category *per se*. Formation or accentuation of a collective identity however can be treated as a necessary intermediate step in the organization of a collective social struggle. I take this to be the role that Axel Honneth (1992) and Kwame Anthony Appiah (1994) give to collective identities in social struggles, and the view that I put forth is based on their accounts.

## Linguistic Mistakes and the Public Language

In the debate concerning the normativity of meaning, there appears to be a common assumption that norms of meaning depend on what speakers mean by their expressions (Eg. Wikforss 2001, Whiting 2016). However, this assumption has some unintuitive consequences regarding linguistic mistakes. If Jane means ancient by ‘arcane’, it seems she does not misuse the term simply by applying it not non-arcane things. Indrek Reiland (2021) has recently argued that this assumption is tied to the Davidsonian individualist view of language. He on the other hand advocates a public view of language and argues that from this perspective it does make sense to call Jane’s use of the term ‘arthritis’ a linguistic mistake.

However, while the appeal to the public language perspective may help to make room for Jane to be *mistaken* about the public meaning of ‘arcane’, it may not be enough to show that she made a *linguistic mistake*. After all, from the public language perspective, rather than making a linguistic mistake, she successfully expressed the false proposition that a non-arcane thing is arcane. If, on the other hand, linguistic mistakes are understood as meaning something other than the public meaning, we have to concede that Jane *can* mean something nonstandard by ‘arcane’. This is a significant concession to the individualist picture and might even lead to the trivialization of the public language view.

How can this unintuitive conclusion be avoided? Reiland appeals to the idea that expressions have rules for their use. This way it might remain possible to maintain both the public view of language and the possibility of linguistic mistakes by arguing that Jane used ‘arcane’ with its standard meaning, but since she broke the rules of its use, she also made a linguistic mistake. But what are these rules of use? Reiland builds on David Kaplan’s ideas and proposes that expressions with truth-functional content like ‘arthritis’ could have similar rules as non-truth-functional expressions such as, ‘goodbye’, ‘ouch’, and ‘oops’, which only have conditions of correct use.

While the conditions of correct use and misuse of expressions like ‘goodbye’ might in theory be explicated along the lines Kaplan suggested, the conditions for expressions like ‘arcane’ remain vague despite Reiland’s attempts to clarify them (2021, 2022). If rules of use of ‘arcane’ are something to the effect of: ‘use ‘arcane’ to mean arcane’, then the dilemma reappears. Either the public language determines what ‘arcane’ means, and Jane cannot help but mean *arcane* by ‘arcane’, or Jane can mean something non-standard by ‘arcane’, which begs the question of what semantic significance, there is to the fact that her meanings do not align with public ones? On the other hand, if the conditions of correct use depend on whether the object in fact is arcane or not, we run the risk of misclassifying some false uses as linguistic mistakes.

Reiland, Indrek (2021). “Linguistic Mistakes”. *Erkenntnis*:1–16.

Reiland, Indrek (2022) “Rules of Use”. *Mind & Language*, Early View

Whiting, Daniel (2016) “What is the normativity of meaning?” *Inquiry*, 59

Wikforss, Åsa (2001) “Semantic normativity”. *Philosophical Studies*, 102

Abstract for Congress for Doctoral Researchers in Philosophy (2022) – “Theme of Security and Friendship in Aristotle's Endoxa in *Nicomachean Ethics* VII” Elmo Kalvas eltasaka@jyu.fi (University of Jyväskylä, Pol. Sci. Supervisor: Mika Ojakangas)

The contents of the paper will be a part of my PhD monograph on Aristotle and the history of the concept of security, and in particular of chapter that will reflect upon connection between Aristotle's concepts of friendship and of security. While the complete chapter will contain discussion of both books VII and IX of NE, this paper will focus on language utilized in *endoxa* presented at the beginning of book VII, and possible interpretations made based on them.

At first, it might seem that Aristotle's presentation on friendship is written mostly through perspective of individuals: the types of friendship and their benefits are described as belonging to particular persons, friends are described as outlet for good actions of individuals, and as means of safeguarding and preservation of their prosperity. However, Aristotle also mentions the importance of friendship for community at whole. (1155a.) So, there are grounds for thinking further about importance of community for understanding of Aristotle's friendship and re-reading the starting views more carefully.

In doing so I consider how various senses surrounding themes of safety and danger operate in starting sentences of Aristotle's elaboration friendship and therefore also set the tone and stakes for further analysis.

# The School Institution between the Private and the Public

Kirjoittaja: Tarna Kannisto 11.10.2022, Helsingin yliopisto

Ohjaajat: yliopistolehtori Olli Loukola, Helsingin yliopisto ja apulaisprofessori Anniina Leiviskä, Oulun yliopisto.

**Abstract:** Settling questions of educational justice, requires a better theoretical grasp on the nature and societal placement of the school as a social institution. In political liberal thought, social institutions are considered the main sites of social justice, but an institution's societal position as whether basic and public or non-basic and private determines those justice principles – political or perfectionist – the institution ought to follow. However, it seems that in this framework, the school situates between the private and public spheres of society even more controversially than the family. Consequently, this uneasy position is at the core of the normative disputes concerning children's formal education, such as teaching of educational content or following school practices that parents consider whether unnecessary or being in discord with their perfectionist values. Therefore, settling matters of educational justice requires clarification on the nature of the school institution as well as the legitimate limits of public and private moralities within schools. In this paper, I clarify the school's institutional standing between the two societal "spheres" and show how this position connects to central normative disputes concerning children's formal education. I argue that adopting any universalistic moral viewpoint, political or perfectionist, does not provide satisfying answers to the normative disputes concerning the school, but that questions of educational justice ought to be considered more contextually, keeping in mind the school's institutional purpose with stronger emphasis on children's own perspective.

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## **On the conditions of conceptually engineering the public approach on societal diversity**

In my article-based PhD dissertation, I scrutinise the notion of the public approach on societal diversity from different perspectives. The paper I aim to present at the Doctoral Congress would provide the basis for the third article of my dissertation. In the paper, I will examine the conditions of conceptually engineering the public approach on societal diversity.

The established concept in public discourses to indicate acceptance of societal diversity and various minorities is 'toleration'/'tolerance'. Considering the significant improvement of the commonly shared public approach towards societal diversity in recent decades (the advancement of same-sex marriage laws being a paradigmatic example), it seems that along with the increased usage of 'tolerance', the current perception of the concept may have gradually shifted beyond the traditional conception in which 'toleration' is bound to a negative evaluation of its respective subject matter. In the altered perception, the acceptance component of 'tolerance' is emphasised while the initial negative evaluation is increasingly omitted.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the concept of 'toleration' seems not to be bound to a negative evaluation of its respective subject matter anymore. Nevertheless, simultaneously the traditional conception of toleration has not vanished which makes it the case that the concept of 'tolerance' apparently may or may not be based on a negative evaluation and is dependent on the doxastic content of each interlocutor.

However, since the concept of 'toleration' plays such a pivotal role in societal discourses, the depicted current situation with an ambiguously perceived common meaning of 'toleration' is normatively unsatisfactory. As a solution, I propose to designate a particular concept for this kind of a public approach on societal diversity that is distinctively not based on a negative but on a neutral or positive evaluation. Earlier I have suggested to replace 'tolerance' in these non-negative instances with a concept grounded on the idea of respect (Klix 2019). The replacement would entail a more fine-grained reformulation of 'respect' which I have coined 'respectation'/'respectance'. This rearticulation would be a conceptually engineered amalgam having the ethos of 'respect', yet the conceptual scope and granularity of 'toleration'/'tolerance'.

In this paper, I aim to elaborate in greater detail on the success conditions of such a reformulation. Firstly, I will outline why 'respect' as a lexical item cannot directly replace 'toleration'/'tolerance' since it is a more general concept and is used in much wider contexts. Furthermore, I will outline the social and political upshots of such a conceptual reorientation. I will argue that this would bear the potential for emancipation and more equal societal relations.

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<sup>1</sup> On the definition and different components of 'toleration'/'tolerance', see Forst (2013)



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### **Eletty addiktio ja eettinen toimijuus Rauhalan holistisen ihmiskäsityksen valossa**

Psykoterapian kentällä vallitsee uskomus, jonka mukaan päihdeaddikti ei kykene psykoterapiaan tai hyödy siitä. Miksi addiktiosta kärsivän täytyy ensin omin voimin päästä riippuvuudestaan eroon, ennekuin hän on tervetullut terapiaan? *Toivu ensin ja tervetuloa sitten terapiaan*- ajattelun taustalla on addiktion aivosairausmalli ja siitä seuraava addiktion sairausdiskurssi, jonka mukaan päihdeaddiktio on krooninen ja relapsoiva aivosairaus. Sairausdiskurssin taustalla olevaa ihmiskuvaa ja oletuksia addiktion luonteesta on tärkeä tutkia, koska sairausdiskurssin seuraus on toimijuuden rapistuminen. Teoreettisessa tutkimuksessa filosofisella menetelmällä tutkin, miten addiktin eettinen toimijuus hahmottuu holistisen ihmiskäsityksen tajunnallisuuden ulottuvuuden valossa. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on lisätä ymmärrystä riippuvuudesta toipumisesta eettisen toimijuuden näkökulmasta. Tutkimuksen metodologisena viitekehyksenä on sosiaalinen konstruktionismi, jonka mukaan sosiaalisen todellisuuden ilmiöt, kuten addiktio, todellistuvat erilaisina diskursseina. Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu yhdestä, addiktion ilmiötä aivosairautena selittävästä tieteellisestä artikkelista, josta addiktion sairausdiskurssin voidaan katsoa saaneen alkunsa. Tutkimuksen teoreettisena viitekehyksenä toimivan holistisen ihmiskäsityksen osalta aineistona toimii kaksi tajunnallisuuden käsitteen kannalta tärkeintä Rauhalan teosta. Analysoin aineistoa lähiluvun keinoin tulkiten niistä addiktion sairausdiskurssin sekä holistisemmän diskurssin, jotka kontrastoiden tarkastelen niitä eettisen toimijuuden näkökulmasta. Tutkimuksen keskeinen tulos on se, että toisin kuin kapeaan ihmiskuvaan perustuvassa sairausdiskurssissa, holistisen ihmiskäsityksen valossa addiktio ei ole redusoitavissa yksilön valintoihin tai aivoihin. Toisin kuin toimijuutta rapauttava sairausdiskurssi, holistisempi diskurssi varjelee persoonan eettistä toimijuutta, joka on toipumisessa olennainen. Addiktin toimijuus voi uinuvaa, mutta sitä voidaan vahvistaa arvoristiriitoja tutkivassa psykoterapiassa, koska holistisessa kehyksessä addiktio näyttäytyy sisäisenä ristiriitaisena taisteluna psyykkisen ja henkisen välillä. Addiktiosta toipuminen edellyttää vastuuta ja toimijuutta. Kun erotamme vastuun ja syyllisyyden käsitteellisesti toisistaan, yksilön vastuullista toimijuutta voidaan psykoterapiassa tulla syyllistämättä toipujaa.

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### **Democratic political culture and the role of solidarity**

Political theorists generally conceive solidarity as valuable for democracy but disagree about the sources of solidarity. For example, liberal nationalists emphasize the link between a shared national identity and solidarity, and statists stress the state's role as an essential institution for producing solidarity. In this presentation, I give a tentative answer on solidarity's role in democratic societies and distinct democratic solidarities from nationalism and statism. Building on existing literature on solidarity, I argue that democratic political cultures can be characterized by their participants' capability to mediate between social and political solidarities, and in other words, stability and openness of solidary ties.

Democratic societies ideally enable all participants to develop meaningful social relations including various solidary relations of care. These relations of social solidarities follow from successful processes of social integration and generate social cohesion. Political solidarities, on the other hand, help in this task as participants are producing new forms, contexts, and collectives of solidarity to solve existing problems in social integration. Both forms of solidarity are critical in complementing each other when democratic communities combat exclusive tendencies and injustices in social integration. Emerging collectives of political solidarities expose the problems of social integration and motivate participants to address them. The ideal of social solidarity alternatively obliges democratically motivated participants of political practices to consider the viability of the social sphere as a whole.

In democratic societies, participants produce and maintain caring relations at various levels, contexts, and collectives without emphasizing natural priority of any of them. Therefore, democratic political cultures can be evaluated in their capability to intermediate between various forms of solidarities to produce a normative order and political culture that supports caring relations between participants of the social sphere. Democratically motivated solidary actions are based on an attitude that leads participants to encounter others sympathetically to expose their shared liability on each other, their institutional common worlds, and the world in general. In this sense, democratic solidarities contradict exclusions or initial borders for the solidary collective.

# Longino's Critical Contextual Empiricism and the feminist criticism of mainstream economics

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## Abstract

I identify and resolve an internal tension in Critical Contextual Empiricism (CCE) – the normative account of science developed by Helen Longino. CCE includes two seemingly conflicting principles: On the one hand, the cognitive goals of epistemic communities should be open to critical discussion (the *openness of goals to criticism* principle, OGC). This means that the necessity of an ongoing process of “transformative criticism” applies not only to assumptions involved in research but also to questions about what kind of knowledge the community should aim to produce. On the other hand, according to Longino, criticism must be aligned with the cognitive goals of that community, i.e., helpful for the community in the pursuits of its cognitive goals, to count as “relevant” and thus to require a response (the *goal-relativity of response-requiring criticism* principle, GRC). I demonstrate how this principle is entailed by the contextualist elements of CCE. The co-existence of OGC and GRC allows to draw both approving and condemning judgments about a situation in which a particular epistemic community ignores criticism targeted at its cognitive goals.

The tension results from conflating two contexts of argumentation which need different regulative standards. There is the “first-level” scientific discussion of an epistemic community and the “second-level” discussion *about* that epistemic community and its role in the broader societal context. In the first-level scientific discussion, GRC is a reasonable principle but OGC is not; in the second-level discussion, the reverse holds. Additionally, I argue that in second-level debates, the relevance of criticism can be established by appealing to social and moral values because that kind of discussion is analogous to public or political discussion, in which value-related premises are expected and relevant. Notably, appeals to values are sufficient to establish the relevance of a criticism even if those values are not part of the “public standards” of the epistemic community targeted by the criticism.

As an illustration, I discuss a particular criticism made by feminist economists against mainstream economics. According to the criticism, economics should incorporate qualitative methods in the study of inequality and thus needs to count among its cognitive goals the pursuit of the kind of understanding provided by those methods. This criticism has evoked little by way of response from mainstream economists. While at first sight, CCE can be used to both approve and condemn the fact that mainstream economists have not engaged with this line of criticism, my analysis entails that the criticism needs a response. Furthermore, my analysis highlights the diverging background assumptions behind each party's thinking and thus reveals questions that should be discussed openly to resolve the disagreement.

# Heidegger, Derrida, and Indifference

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## Abstract

In the philosophies of Heidegger and Derrida, the concept of indifference is present but has not really been systematically examined. The main purpose of this article is to explain the meaning of indifference in Heidegger and Derrida and its effect on their respective systems by grasping the inner connection of the two philosophers' thoughts, and by means of the key concepts in their philosophy. The reflections of F. W. J. Schelling and Jean-Luc Marion on the same theme will also be brought into the process of interpretation and play a positive role. The three concepts of indifference, ontological difference, and *différance* will eventually intertwine as they are interpreted in terms of one another.

# Holonic Account of Moral Status in Ecological Restoration

Linnea Luuppala

## Abstract:

Ecological restoration provides a challenging context for environmental ethical theories due to the many conflicts that emerge from different scales of analysis, most notably individualistic versus holistic perspectives (e.g. Shrader-Frechette 1996; McShane 2014). I propose that the context of conflict in restoration reveals some important gaps in the current environmental ethical theorising. Based on these findings, I will propose a new account of moral ontology called the *holonic account of moral status*.

I will provide a schematic of the holonic account of moral status. The holonic approach is inspired by the concept of a “holon” coined by Arthur Koestler’s (1967), which I am applying to the environmental ethical context. My interpretation of the concept of a holon recognises the complexity of the world and how entities exist in intricate interconnectedness, where entities are simultaneously individuals, yet also a part of a larger whole. It is a concept that depicts a relational part-whole hierarchy. I will also be drawing from hierarchy theory (Simon 1962; Allen and Hoekstra 2015) and complexity theory (Simon 1973; Wimsatt 1972) to argue for the holonic moral ontology. A holonic account of moral status allows for the integration of reductionism and holism, but also importantly highlights the relational aspects that have often been ignored in environmental ethics. I suggest that my interpretation of the holon helps to reconcile at least some of the difficult tensions between the different levels of moral analysis. The strength of this account is that it recognises value at different levels, from individual to wholes, from human to non-human, while leaving room for contextuality and flexibility.

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## Nonbinary genders within a Haslangerian gender system

In Sally Haslanger's famous definition of 'women' and 'men' as socially constructed gender categories, S is a woman or a man if and only if S is observed or imagined to have certain bodily features that are assumed to be evidence of S's biological role in reproduction, as either female or male. S having these assumed features marks their role within the dominant ideology as someone who should occupy either subservient or privileged social role. The fact that S satisfies the previous conditions then plays a role in their systematic subordination or privilege.

The provided definition seems to apply only to binary genders, that is, to men and women, and it leaves out the people whose gender does not fall neatly under either of those categories. There is a lack of epistemic tools that can be used to analyse the structural oppression faced by nonbinary people. The aim of this talk is to examine different possibilities on how the oppression of nonbinary genders can be understood by using the framework of social privilege and oppression.

One possibility is to understand and analyse nonbinary gender categories as genders that are constructed by fixing their place as oppressed within the current hierarchical structure and examining the basis of that oppression. This is done by providing a Haslangerian focal analysis of nonbinary genders as an oppressed gender category and exploring what relevant gender roles, norms, internalised roles, ideas and gender symbolisms could build nonbinary genders as a category within current gender hierarchy. It becomes apparent that while nonbinary genders as marginalised gender categories do not hold a position of social privilege, they are not oppressed in the same way as women either.

This indicates that not all gender-based oppression can be analysed by relying on a binary understanding of gender-based privilege and oppression, or by assuming that oppression is always based on the assumed role in reproduction. Furthermore, there are different forms that the oppression of nonbinary people can take. I propose two different accounts: one in which nonbinary people are oppressed specifically as nonbinary, and another where the oppression is in part based on denying the desired gender category membership and gender identity.

## **Ordinary Morality and Demandingness of Climate Action**

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There is a great urgency to mitigate, adapt to, and soon also compensate the effects of climate change, and it will most likely be costly and require many sacrifices from many people. At the same time, the so-called Ordinary Morality holds that people should be able to pursue their life goals or ground projects, live decent lives, and that morality does not take over every aspect of their lives. Efficient climate action and Ordinary Morality seem to be conflicting, and the further we delay climate action, the more radical changes we will have to face. The challenge is that Ordinary Morality does not allow the kind of extreme demands that effective climate action seems to require.

The main research question in this paper is can Ordinary Morality provide grounds for effectively and adequately responding to climate change? One of the aims of my dissertation is to understand this conflict and determine how demanding morality can be in the era of catastrophic climate change. This paper is based on the first half of my dissertation, where the aim is to support this endeavor by first identifying where Ordinary Morality seems to fail in responding to climate change, and whether it can be amended or altered somehow so that it still holds much of its intuitive appeal, and yet gives tools for responding to climate change.

An important first step is to determine what constitutes Ordinary Morality. In line with the methodological approach of my dissertation, an analysis with the method of wide reflective equilibrium is used here. The analysis is divided into three levels: the level of background theories, principles, and considered judgments. In the method of wide reflective equilibrium, beliefs on each level are reflected and re-negotiated until a coherent system is reached, so that all beliefs on all levels are coherent with one another. In this paper I will focus on the two upper levels of wide reflective equilibrium, namely background theories and principles. I will conclude with a few remarks how changes in these levels might alter considered judgments, especially those about demandingness, and suggest that the core principles of Ordinary Morality might after all permit effective and ambitious climate action, or even better, they seem to require it.

## **Abstract: Causal Meanings**

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*Spring 2022*

Why is reference of interest to philosophy of language? One naturalistically inclined answer is that the theory of reference can help answer certain scientifically interesting properties of language that differentiate it from other forms of animal communication. To give just one example, natural language is ostensibly stimulus-independent in the sense that there is little if any correlation between the words used on a given occasion and the immediate surrounding environment, which is typically not the case with animal communication (barring some exceptions). The peculiar feature of words is that they often have references that are not dependent on the immediate attention of the communicating subjects. This same striking feature of language at once raises a more philosophically familiar problem: how are the referents of words determined? And what does “determination” mean?

The purpose of this paper is to develop an answer to these two questions in the context of what David Bloor has called “meaning finitism”. Briefly, the core idea of meaning finitism is that the semantic values (e.g. extensions) of expression tokens are not absolutely determined. To be absolutely determined means that, for every meaningful expression token, there is a unique function such that every possible application of the token is determinately correct or incorrect according to the function. (For instance, the function determines a set of all the circumstances of application paired with consequences of application where the application would be correct, and by symmetry excludes all the pairs where the application would be incorrect.) The motivations for meaning finitism will not be touched on the paper itself except for reference in their roots in the skeptical challenge made famous by Saul Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein’s later works.

At first glance meaning finitism appears to entail anti-realism about meanings since, if no token expression has a unique semantic value in the aforementioned sense, how can it be determinately meaningful at all? The contention of this paper is that, appearances notwithstanding, there is a way to build a realistically inclined theory of reference on finitist grounds. The theory will be broadly causal-historical in species, and draws from work in that tradition by Michael Devitt and Mario Gómez-Torrente. The core idea is to retain the Fregean approach in which one important theoretical task of meanings is to determine referents of expressions, combined with Devitt’s “shocking idea” that at least some meanings are non-descriptive causal-historical chains of reference.

Another important joint by which to make a finitist theory of reference work is to adjust the theoretical aims of the theory. Traditionally it has been thought that the purpose of theory of reference is to explain how at least some sentence tokens come to have truth conditions. However, since I take it to be a consequence of finitism that no sentence has truth conditions, the aims of the theory of reference have to be adjusted. The new aim that I propose is to explain, not truth conditions of sentences, but rather certain truths about human classificatory practices. Contra anti-realism, this does not mean reducing reference to epistemic notions about how humans are e.g. disposed to classify things, but, following Gómez-Torrente, it will be argued that although epistemic concerns do play a role in determining reference, there is also a realistic element to how referents are determined.



## Interpersonal scaffoldings of shared emotions

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### Abstract

The paper examines shared emotions in the context of interpersonally scaffolded affectivity and socially extended emotions. Some have argued that shared emotions are socially extended emotions for in such experience the “other” necessarily constitutes a “part and parcel” of one’s experience, thus, making the interpersonal integration a constitution of shared experience. Others have concentrated on illustrating how in some cases of mutual affect regulation there emerges a *coupled system*, that may suffice to a shared experience. However, the descriptive level of how shared emotions are interpersonally scaffolded is yet underdeveloped. Drawing on the work of Colombetti & Krueger (2015) and Salmela & Nagatsu (2022) this paper is in attempt to further illustrate collective dimension of interpersonal scaffolding of affect by discussing a) how the sense of togetherness, underlying experiences of emotional sharing, is supported and maintained by interpersonal scaffoldings of affects, and b) how individuals depend on each other in achieving the mutual awareness of their “feeling alike”.

**Keywords:** Extended mind, affective scaffolding, collective affective niches, coupling, socially extended emotions, interpersonal scaffolding, shared emotions, shared affectivity, togetherness

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Title: Social practices grounding mathematical reality

Abstract:

Social constructionism about mathematics is the metaphysical view that the abstract entities studied in mathematics, from the real numbers to the set theoretic universe, are social constructions that exist in virtue of mathematical practices. But what exactly is the role of the social in mathematical existence? I tackle the question by analyzing social construction as metaphysical grounding. In terms of grounding, the central claim of social constructionism is that mathematical entities are real but nonfundamental entities that are grounded in mathematical practices. But since to be socially constructed is to be grounded in distinctive social patterns (Schaffer 2016), the question becomes: in what way are mathematical practices social practices?

The first step in answering this question is to recognize that mathematical practice involves the practitioners and their interactions. Ferreirós (2016) characterizes a mathematical practice as what the community of mathematicians do when they employ resources (such as frameworks, symbols, methods) on the basis of their cognitive abilities to solve problems, prove theorems, and shape theories. On the basis of this characterization, my claim is that mathematical practices are a combination of (1) distinctly mathematical aspects (e.g. proofs, concepts, methods) as resources and (2) patterns of interaction among communities of agents, within which the resources are employed and managed. Importantly, the patterns of interaction have the central characteristics of a social practice, as defined by Haslanger (2018), and they play a part in giving rise to mathematical entities. The conclusion is that the social in social constructionism is due to social practices being partial grounds of mathematical reality.

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# Return to nature? Bolzano's 'deducibility' as an alternative to Tarski's logical consequence

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## Abstract

The model-theoretic definition of logical consequence, a standard piece of today's mathematical logic, is originally based on Alfred Tarski's (1936) semantic account of logical consequence. According to a common claim, Tarski's account was anticipated already a century earlier by Bernard Bolzano's (1837) definition of 'deducibility' (*Ableitbarkeit*). Is this really the case—or is it so that, from the modern perspective, it is just too easy to view Bolzano as someone who merely attempted to do what Tarski later managed to do, and fail to appreciate his achievement in its own merit?

In this presentation, I go through previous conceptions of the relation between Bolzano's and Tarski's accounts and contrast them with my own reading of the two definitions in their original contexts. I argue that, despite their structural similarities, their intended extensions are so different that they should be construed as two separate concepts: in short, Tarski replaces the natural but messy concept of consequence with a clean but artificial one, while Bolzano analyzes the natural concept more or less as it is. I illustrate and develop this hypothesis by analyzing particular differences between the two accounts, such as the significance of the distinction between logical and non-logical constants, Bolzano's ideas and propositions in contrast to Tarski's terms and sentences, as well as Bolzano's insistence on and Tarski's rejection of the Aristotelian condition on the compatibility of the premises. I conclude that Bolzano's 'deducibility' is not as much related to Tarskian logical consequence as it is to *natural* logical consequence, by which I mean the concept of logical consequence as it pertains to natural language before any formalization.

## **THE “IMPOSSIBILITY” IN THE IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS OF ALGORITHMIC FAIRNESS**

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The now well-known “impossibility results” of algorithmic fairness demonstrate that two independently plausible statistical criteria of fairness cannot be simultaneously satisfied except in highly constrained circumstances. Taken at face value, the impossibility results are rather disheartening, suggesting any predictive algorithm is bound to be unfair in some respect. They have also sprouted debate in recent works. In this paper, I will argue against a standard interpretation of the results and distinguish two alternative ones. The two alternative interpretations of the impossibility results reveal different sets of moral and political stakes. I discuss their respective implications against the background of debates concerning the possibility of “ideal justice” in nonideal conditions, on the one hand, and the nature of moral justification of risk-imposing policies, on the other.

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## **Questioning and Meaningful Life**

The paper is a co-authored one in which I am the second author. The first author is Jan Varpanen. The topic is an ascetic practice of questioning for a meaningful life. This practice is exemplified by the second author living in relative material scarcity in an apartment without electricity. The practice is motivated by finding the normal life to be too much a case of meaningless pursuit of ever new goals; a ceaseless material and cultural consumption of always something new. Thus the answer to the question of meaningful life always seems to be just beyond the horizon. The practice of questioning for a meaningful life is presented not as a total withdrawal from the society thus understood, but as a relative distancing of oneself from it. To take seriously the questioning for life's meaning is to move beyond the space where such a meaning is self-evidently found. In our example, it is to move to an apartment without electricity.

We will conceptualize the ascesis of questioning for a meaningful life as a questioning practice of the self. This concept is a communication between Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger. We use Foucault's idea of the practice of the self to elaborate questioning as a philosophy that is inherently dependent on practical concerns, as a way of life. Also Foucault allows us to understand questioning as a form of resistance to the prevalent power structures of contemporary society; a counter-conduct to the normal way of conducting oneself. Heidegger, in turn, will allow us to understand the movement of questioning through three different qualitative stages, or, in Heidegger's vocabulary, "grounds". Thus, initially the questioning practice of the self is grounded by the (1) distorted ground of questionless calculative thinking, the endless pursuit of the horizon of meaning. The establishment of a space in the form of an apartment without electricity signifies a change in which the questioning for meaning is (2) groundless, that is, it is an abiding in a questioning no longer grounded upon the horizon of promised but ever elusive fulfillment. The continued abiding, however, makes possible the (3) primordial ground, the encountering of Being as question-worthy. It is at this last stage of ascesis that the questioning practice is about questioning without expecting an answer. Here the meaningfulness is at last found, but no longer as an answer that always escapes one's grasp but, instead, as a question and in the very act of questioning itself.

## Revised Notion of Discourse Domains for the Truth Pluralists

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### Abstract

Truth pluralists argue that the nature of truth varies across discourse domains. Despite this, domains have not been studied to the extent that one would expect in current truth pluralist literature. Motivated by persistent issues with prominent subject matter or topics-based approaches to individuating domains, a thus far neglected ontology-based approach is articulated and defended. By identifying domains based on the ontological status of the referents of truth-relevant concepts of sentences, domains are rendered as well-individuated classes of sentences with determinate rules for membership that exist independent of our categorizations about them. Based on this, two major benefits over subject matter-based approaches to individuating domains are achieved. First, the ontology-based approach helps motivate the generic truth pluralist claim of truths variability across domains. Second, the ontology-based approach avoids certain technical issues that follow from the strictly non-truth-theoretical project of demarcating content kinds on grounds of subject matters. As a result, an improved understanding of domains is proposed for the truth pluralists to scale their definitions, and for all types of theorists to utilize that seek robust boundaries between discursive contents.

**Keywords:** truth pluralism, discourse domains, mixed discourse, semantic ambiguity, ontological categories

# A Sentiocentric Duty to Dematerialise Wellbeing

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**Abstract.** Animal ethicists have demonstrated since the 1970s that the interests of sentient nonhuman animals matter. Sentience is morally relevant, as it entails having a wellbeing and interests. Furthermore, thinkers such as Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Christine Korsgaard, Joan Dunayer, and Alasdair Cochrane have argued that nonhuman animals not only matter morally: they are not inferior in comparison to humans. Indeed, differential treatment based on species classification is a form of discrimination, that is, speciesism. Moreover, hierarchies cannot justifiably rely on dissimilar abilities, because that would represent ableism, another form of discrimination (see e.g., Taylor, 2017). It would also be unfair to claim that individuals are morally unequal based on some other factors they cannot control. Because all properties, group memberships, and relationships of individuals are influenced to some extent by uncontrollable factors, all claims of moral inequality are arbitrary (Tiisala, 2020, chap. 5). There is, thus, a convincing justification for the moral equality of all sentient beings. An open question is, rather, what exactly this sentiocentric equality, or sentiocentric unitarianism, entails.

In this paper, I argue that a central implication of sentiocentric unitarianism is that moral agents have a *prima facie* duty to dematerialise the wellbeing of themselves and of other sentient beings to a maximal extent. Sentiocentric unitarianism entails a change in the perspective to the governance of socio-ecological systems, as this governance should build on the equality of all sentient beings. In my deontological account, governance should aim at respecting all sentient beings, their equal inherent value, and basic moral rights. Based on empirical research, at least all paradigmatic vertebrates are sentient. Dunayer (e.g., 2013), however, suggests based on empirical research and the benefit of the doubt that all animals with any type of nervous system should be regarded as sentient. The number of equal right-holders increases, in any case, drastically in the sentiocentric and unitarian account of rights. Consequently, I argue that material resources become severely scarce in the sentiocentric and unitarian governance of socio-ecological systems. Although sentient beings also have shared interests in socio-ecological systems, there are trade-offs and harsh competition for survival as well. For instance, food, water, and space are competed by sentient animals, nonhumans and humans. All cannot survive, as the reproduction rates of sentient beings exceed the availability and production of resources. Because consuming material resources reduces what is left for others, and there are morally equal others in urgent need, I argue that consuming material resources for oneself is *prima facie* morally permitted only for self-preservation. Moreover, there is a *prima facie* duty to satisfy all interests with minimal consumption of material resources to minimise harm to others. Additionally, the scarcity of sinks for material waste sets limits to morally permissible seeking of wellbeing. I conclude that there is a *prima facie* duty to dematerialise wellbeing and economies.

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## **Life as a Kuhnian Anomaly**

Congress for Doctoral Researchers in Philosophy, Tampere 2022

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Philosophy of Science

Biological science appears to be undergoing a shift of focus, which by some authors has been interpreted as a transition “from the century of the genome to the century of the organism” (Soto et al. 2016). At the heart of the proposed transition is the idea that a living organism can be conceptualized as a material system on its own right, irrespectively of evolutionary-historical considerations. Hence, if the motto of the past century biology was Theodosius Dobzhansky’s classic tenet “Nothing in biology makes sense except in light of evolution”, the organicist movement presumes that, on the contrary, much of biology could and should make sense in the light of the characteristic organization of living organisms as material systems. Furthermore, many organicists presume that the organizational aspects are what must be clarified first, in order to make sense of evolution itself as the “historical dimension of life” (Moreno & Mossio 2015). In the present paper, my aim is to employ Thomas Kuhn’s notions of an anomaly, a puzzle, and a counterinstance for analysing the thus changing landscape of biological thought, and particularly in its relation to the physical sciences. What I propose is that by recognizing biology’s subject matter, life, as a physical anomaly, the organicist transition, if indeed occurring, can be understood as a conversion from conceiving life as a puzzle towards seeing it as a counterinstance. In other words, I suggest that while the past century physics-biology relation was characterized by the basic belief that life can be explained without compromising on the principles of physics, the present century might be rather moved by a possibility to learn lessons of the material world by problematizing the living organism as a natural system.